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The 1913 and 1914 White Workers' Strikes
A. O'Quigley
Introduction
The gold mining industry on the Rand began in the lBSO's and by 1913 there were
63 mines employing about 21 000 white workers and 200 000 black workers.
Gold, the international money commodity, had a fixed price. This meant there was
a certain constraint with regard to the costs of production because increases
could not be passed on to the buyers. The gold bearing ore on the Rand was deep
lying and of a consistent low grade throughout the Reef. Because of its depth
large amounts of capital investment were required for its exploitation. This
was provided by finance houses in Europe through whom groups of gold mining com-
panies were controlled. The profitability of the industry was constrained by
the fixed price, the low grade of the ore and the need for large scale capital
investment. Because of this the industry depended on cheap labour.
The problem of finding and maintaining a supply of cheap labour dominated the
policies of the industry. In the early years the great majority of blacks lived
in the rural areas subsisting as independent farmers or on white owned land as
squatters, share croppers and wage labourers. The long process of detaching
( -black labour from the land to produce for white owned economic enterprises was
partly achieved through the implementation of taxes by government which forced
peasants to obtain cash. As far as the gold mining industry was concerned in the
early years some blacks came voluntarily in order to obtain cash to buy European
produced goods such as guns. But increasingly black labour was obtained by
recruiters who worked for the gold mining industry. Various means were employed
by recruiters to obtain black labour including debt inducement. The gold mining
capitalists quickly realised that co-operation between them was necessary to
prevent their competition driving up the price of black labour. Centrally con-
trolling recruiting agencies were established which operated throughout Southern
Africa. The gold companies also agreed not to pay black labour more than a certain
wage. This policy of co-operation was supervised by the Transvaal Chamber of
Mines (TCM) a centralised policy making body to which most gold companies
affiliated (1). They also eventually realized that the partially proletarianised
native of the labour force, which meant that it fluctuated with changes in labour
migration patterns, although a headache for managers was actually an advantage for
an industry based on cheap labour. It meant that very low wages could be paid
because the migrants family and his future were provided for in the rural areas.
(;' The black labour force thus obtained was lacking in a»y-experience of industrial
life and was restricted to unskilled work. In order to develop the mines and
carry out certain skilled mining operations the gold companies also needed a
supply of skilled workers. These were not available in South Africa. Skilled
miners from overseas were induced £o come to the. Witwatersrand because of the
relatively high wgges. Most of them originated in Britain. Skilled miners tended
to be nomadic and some had experience of work in Australia, America and other gold
fields throughout the world. These miners' brought to South Africa their trade
union experience and soon established branches of British craft unions and an
autonomous miners union (2). As in Britain the craft unions operated to restrict
access to their trade to maintain the scarcity of skills, prevent dilution of
1 See Rick Johnstone "Class, Race and Gold"
2 See Elaine Katz 'A Trade Union Aristocracy' 1976 A.S.I.
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labour and keep up its price. The miners union also began as a union of skilled
workers. For many years it was very weak perhaps partly because the workers at
that time felt unthreatened by dilution and because their rates of pay were relatively
high and partly because of their tendency to be nomadic and to see their 'home*
as being in Britain where their families probably were. Apart from their tendency
to migrate from goldfield to goldfield they were very mobile between mines on the
Rand which militated against the development of strong trade unions.
Because of their rates of pay,their momopoly of skills and their resulting bar-
gaining power the TCM was anxious to free themselves from their dependency on
the white workers. For many years they refused to recognise trade unions and tried
to discourage and weaken them (3). In 1909, partly for strategic reasons, the
TCM drew up an agreement with the engine drivers' union. They hoped this would
prevent the engine drivers from participating in a white workers' strike. The
engine drivers were critical for operations becasue the mining regulations res-
tricted control of machines for hauling men to whites.
As blacks became experienced in gold mining operations the TCM wanted to be able
to substitute this labour for the more expensive white workers. Skilled whites
were still necessary but where skills could be fragmented blacks could carry out
some of the operations. As time passed the 'all-round' skilled miner was grad-
ually replaced by a worker whose only qualification was the possession of a'blasting
.certificate' (4) and whose main occupation was supervising the black workers.
These new workers came from the ranks of newly proletarianised Afrikaners. This
process had begun to become apparent by 1913. At this date 31% of white miners
•were South African born (5).
The miners' trade union, the Transvaal Miners Association (TMA), tried to recruit
these workers. As unskilled workers they were very vulnerable to replacment by
blacks. As workers who saw their future and their children's future to lie in
South Africa they were more concerned with maintaining a place for whites in the
gold mining industry. Unlike the craft unions the TMA recruited unskilled workers,
but only whites. Unlike the craft unions which tried to restrict access to the
craft by means of trade union rules; apprenticeship, and agreements with the employers,
the TMA tried to prevent black encroachment by legislative means. Partly because
of the pressure of the white workers some mining regulations had been promulgated
which restricted certain mining operations, such as blasting and hauling men to
whites. The TMA tried to ensure that these regulations were complied with. In
1910 the TMA had a membership not much greater than the craft unions although it
had a much larger potential membership draw on. It increased rapidly after this and
soon outpaced them (6).
In 1913 the gold mining industry war the only industry of any size in South Africa.
The value of gold produced in 1913 was £37 372 949. This compares with £17 248 834
for all manufacturing industry (1911 figure). There were many industries which
had been stimulated by the development of the gold mining industry. Craft unions
had been developed in some of these industries whose membership included a large
3 e.g. see evidence of Mining Unions to Economic Commission of 1925
4 This was required by Mining Regulations. In the Transvaal only whites could
obtain it.
5 Select Committee on European Employment 1913. Evidence of Dr L.G. Irvine a
member of the Advisory Committee of Miners' Phthisis Board.
6 Year Book No 1 1910-16 p. 284
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proportion of the white worker employer in the industry (7). The infrastructure
necessary for the growth of the gold industry was developed under state control.
This included the railways which was the only other largescale employer of white
labour. They employed 31,066 whites 5340 of whom were artizans and 16,518 of
whom were running staff. Some of the artizans belonged to the craft unions. The
Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) was a general railway
union and all railway employees were eligible for membership.
This is largely an emprirical study of the 1913 miners1 strike and the 1914 rail-
way strike. I concentrate on events rather than analysis and would be glad of
any help from people in the seminar. Although it is impossible to exhaustively
state the causes for the 1913 strike I outline some of the factors I see as im-
portant. These include the insecurity of white miners because of their fear of
being replaced by black and their reaction to general labour condition including
their insecurity of tenure and the occupational disease phthisis. The strike
itself revolved around the question of the recognition of trade unions which the
TCM refused to do. As far as the trade unions were concerned recognition by
the controllers of the industry was an important first step in getting some
control over the conditions of their labour. The TCM, as a representative of
Imperial Capital, formulated policies that would allow for the fullest exploita-
tion and therefore wanted absolute control of the industry. As already pointed
out they wanted to free themselves as much as possible from dependency on white
labour which was expensive and pushed up costs of production which it was essen-
tial to minimise. The government at first played an inconspicuous role in the
strike but when it rapidly escalated they attempted to repress it by force and
many people were killed. The strike ended in a compromise with white labour.
The government prepared legislation which would have led to the recognition and
incorporation of trade unions. At the same time they prepared comprehensive re-
pressive measures in the expectation that continuing unrest among white workers
would lead to another strike. When the railway strike was called in January 1914
Martial Law was immediately declared, there was a mass mobilization of troops and
harsh repressive measures were enforced. The strike movement collapsed ignomi-
niously. The proposed industrial legislation was not passed. I argue that the
governments' actions in 1913 and 1914 must be seen in the context of an economy
dependent on cheap black labour and unable to find a permanent role for white
labour, which also led to extreme fear of White worker action leading to black
unrest, and of a polity dependent on maintaining its links, as a peripheral state,
with the Imperial power.
1913 and 1914 were years of general labour unrest. There were also strikes by
Indian and Black workers. I do not examine these strikes. But it is important to
notice that, even though the employers and the government were unable to formulate
any long term policy for white labour and responded repressively, as far as the
Black and Indian workers were concerned the repression and use of violence by the
state was far more naked.
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The Dispute Starts at the New Kleinfontein Mine
The 1913 strike of white gold miners started as a local dispute on the New Klein-
fontein mine and it was several weeks before it developed to become a large scale
confrontation involving the whole mining industry.
In May 1913 a new manager came to the New Kleinfontein mine. As was the custom at
the time, he brought a number of miners from his old mine with him and a number
of white workers on the New Kleinfontein left, 75 out of a total of 461 white
workers. According to the manager 15 of these had been dismissed, the rest left
voluntarily (1).
The manager decided to reorganize the work of the underground mechanics. He dis-
charged two mechanics and put two on the surface. As part of his policy he wished
to alter the hours of work to correspond with those of white miners on the mine i.e.
7.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. every day except Sunday, whereas previously underground
mechanics had finished work at 12.30 p.m. on Saturdays. The men refused to work the
new hours and left the mine on 10 May. The mechanics' trade union, the Amalgamated
Society of Engineers, or ASE, posted notices on the mine forbidding their members
to fill the places of the five underground mechanics who had left. The manager
employed men who did not belong to the trade union to replace those who had left.
The Inspector of White Labour warned him that under the Industrial Disputes Act
of 1904 he should have given a month's notice of the intention to change the
conditions of work (2) . In his evidence to the Witwatersrand Disturbances Commis-
sion the manager admitted that he had acted summarily. He claimed that he made
the change for reasons of efficiency although he did not know whether the sit-
uation that had previously existed at the New Kleinfontein had caused any problems.
He acted without finding out what the customary hours on the other mines were.
Negotiations between the manager and the ASE officials, who wanted reinstatement of
the men on the old terms, proved abortive. On 26 May the white miners on the Number
2 shaft at the New Kleinfontein refused to go to work. The trade unions held a
ballot of all the white workers at the New Kleinfontein and a strike was declared.
On 28 May a strike committee was formed consisting of R. Haynes {Chairman) , J.T.
Bain (Secretary), T. Matthews (Secretary TMA), T.A. Tole (V-President Transvaal
Federation), D. Dingwall (Pres. of the S.A. Council of Boilermakers' Society),
G.H. Kendall (Organizing Secretary of the ASE), J. Pender (Organizer of the Amal-
gamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners), R. Waterston (Organizer of the Engine
Drivers1 and Firemens1 Association), George Mason and D. Simons (3). .They were all
trade union officials, none of them were employed at the New Kleinfontein mine.
The strike committee demanded the reinstatement of the mechanics and a reversion
to the old hours. Management refused to have anything""to do with the committee
because they were not New Kleinfontein employees. Employees would, of course, not
submit demands for fear of victimisation. • Attempts at mediation by government
officials proved abortive (4). The strike committee refused to consider any offer
not made directly to them. After *the strike had begun the demands of the strikers
1. Wits Disturbances Commission 1913 (henceforth called Disturbances Commission)
Evid. of the manager, Bulman.
2. MNW 253 mm 2896/14 IWL to secretary Mines and Industries 8.2.14
3. Disturbances Colmission Report
4. A discussion of these negotiations follows in the next section.
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escalated. One of the reasons for this was the confidence of the leaders that
the men on strike were solidly behind them and the apparent strong sense of
solidarity of the strikers. Strikers and their leaders wanted to muster support
amongst other mine workers. To do this it would be necessary that the New Klein-
fontein men be seen to be fighting on general issues and not only over the
'domestic affairs' of the mine. Initially this support was necessary for finan-
cial reasons but as time passed it became apparent that the general support of
white mine workers would be necessary to overcome the intransigence of the
management.
The Transvaal Miners1 Association (TMA) Executive and the Federation of Trades,
to whom the TMA were affiliated^were against a general strike but the strike
committee was divided on the issue (5). The escalated demands included a de-
mand for a Saturday afternoon holiday for all white mine workers and later a
demand for an 8 hour day, bank to bank (6) . (Bank to bank means the time taken to
get to the rock face and back to the surface is included in the 8 hour day) . The
mining regulations restricted the hours of underground workers to 8 hours, face
to face; in other words they were not paid for time taken to get to the face.
On 7 June notices were posted up at the mine offering to revert to original hours,
to reinstate all the strikers and to organize a committee to see if the Saturday
shift could be started and finished earlier. Committee representatives would be
nominated from among employees only, not trade unionists (7). The notice also
said that all men who did not return to work by 11 June would be paid off and
would not be taken back (8). As a result of this the New Kleinfontein employees
held a ballot in which a large majority voted in favour of continuing the strike
and voted in favour of calling a general strike of all mineworkers (9).
On 11 June the management of New Kleinfontein restarted operations using strike
breakers and began erecting fences around the property to protect them (10).
The majority of the workers employed were new (11), which vindicates claims of
the strike committee, put forward in opposition to press reports, that few men
had returned to work (12). According to the strike breakers, they were offered
50% more than the usual rate while the strike was on, permanent employment
afterwards and complete protection (13). The management also issued notices of
eviction on single and married strikers who lived on mine property (14).
Op to the 11th Benoni, where most of the strikers lived had been absolutely
quiet, the strikers had restricted themselves to peaceful picketing of the mine
(15), but from this date onwards the atmosphere became increasingly tense.
Violence, drunkenness,and destruction of property, including arson, increased(16).
The strikers took action to try to prevent the operations on the New Kleinfontein
continuing. Bands of strikers stopped supply wagons on the road and destroyed
goods destined for the mine (17). The homes of scabs and relatives and freinds
of scabs were attacked and many houses were burnt (18). On 26 June the police
of Boksburg magisterial district asked for permission to close down licensed
premises in Benoni because of the ^ alarming" increase of drunkenness in town and
the increasingly ugly temper of the strikers (19). Scabs were assaulted occasion-
ally they were only humiliated^but often the assaults were very brutal (20).
Soon Benoni was 'festooned' with red - people flew red flags from their houses
and wore red rosettes to indicate allegiance and ensure protection (21).
The strike committee handed out permits to strikers and strike sumpathizers to
protect their property (22). A firm which supplied bread before the strike to
the New Kleinfontein mine were forced by the strike committee to promise that
they would cease supplying New Kleinfontein personnel ( 23). This did not
save them from having their premises burnt down (24).
5. Disturbances Commission. Evidence of Acting I.W.L. 02133 re meeting of TMA on
1.6.13 when Haynes J.F. Brown, Tole, Kendall, Matthews, Carbis and Tworaey said
that strike must be confined to the New Kleinfontein.
6. Disturbance Commission IWL 0.104. Under Secretary for Mines 0.301. Also MNW 253
MM 2896/14 IWL to secretary mines and Industries 8.2.14.
7. Report of Disturbances commission.
8. ibid
9 ihiH
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In view of the fact that the management refused to negotiate with the strike
committee and the fact that with the employment of strikebreakers the mine was
soon running successfully, the strikers made attmepts to induce the black mine-
workers to join the strike (25). There were sporadic strikes of black mineworkers
from 14 June which continued until after the white mineworkers had returned to
work (26).
On 16 June a deputation of strikers went to see the manager (27). The discussion
resulted in a deadlock over the issue of the strikers' demand for the reinstatement
of all the men. The manager said this was impossible because he had to consider
the strikebreakers whom he had engaged. He also said that he would not consider
taking part in any further negotiations (28).
The Strike Spreads
In this situation, with the mine producing successfully, the strikers decided
that the only means of applying pressure available to them was to spread the
strike. A group of strikers visited neighbouring mines. The Van Ryn mine balloted
against a strike but were persuaded to join the strike by Trade union leaders,
J.T.Bain and A. Crawford (30). According the police evidence Crawfore addressed
the men asking those who support the New Klinfontein strikers to stand on one
side, the scabs on the other (31). On 19 June the strikers went to the New
Modderfontein. Here, too, the official ballot was against a strike, but the
white workers came out on 21 June. On all these mines the engine drivers came
out with the rest of the men. In previous strikes a lack of agreement between the
engine drivers and the white miners had seriously weakened the strikes (32). On
19 June the strike leaders Bain, Mason, Brown and Tole were arested for inciting
to stike, a crime under the Industrial Disputes Act (Transvaal 1909) (33).
10 Disturbances commission Evidence of IWL Q2 140 and Assistant Magistrate
Boksburg Q861
11 ibid. Evidence of IWL
12 ibid. Annexure B8. Leaflet of Federation of Trades
13 MNW 191 MM 2547/13 J. Laropert Solicitor to Minister Mines 26.7.13
14 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q1614
15 MNW 165 IWL Report May 1913
16 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q1661, 528.
17 ibid
18 ibid Q1532
19 'Justice1 165 Magistrate Boksburg to Secretary for Justice 26.6.13
20 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence 0789
21 ibid Also Assistant Magistrate C844 -W-
22 ibid SAP Evidence Q2770, Exhibit B10 Annexures, "Transvaal Leader1 31.7.13
23 ibid Evidence of G.M. Taylor
24 ibid Q3694 onwards
25 ibid Evidence of Assistant Magistrate and Resident Magistrate Boksburg and
H.M. Taberer of the Native Recruiting Corporation Q8 49,979,1028.
26 Discussed later
27 Disturbances Commission Evidence of IWL $244-51.
28 ibid
30 ibid IWL Q256
31 ibid SAP Evidence pl478
32 Rand Daily Mail (henceforth RDM) 1.7.13, also Justice1 165 Colonel
 ruter,
commissioner SAP to Attorney General 3.6.13.
33 Disturbances Commission.SAP Evidence O427
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Although he had played a prominent part in persuading workers to strike Crawford
was not arrested.
According to the evidence of the manager of the Brakpan mines, on 20 June the
workshop and surface employees on the mine passed a vote of censure on the strike
committee for calling out the Van Ryn and New Modderfontein workers. On 21st the
underground employees passed a resolution dissociating themselves from the vote
of censure of the surface employees. This an interesting index of the difference
in the way these two groups perceived their interests. On 30 June white workers
on the Modderfontein B mine struck. Notices were immediately posted up ordering
single men to vacate mine quarters by 2 July and married men by 7 July. Under-
standably enough this caused a lot of bitterness among the men and the strike
committee threatened to withdraw the pump men and allow the mine to flood if the
notice was not withdrawn (35).
In an attempt to stop bands of strikes going from mine to mine pulling out other
workers the magistrate of Boksburg was authorized to issue an order prohibiting .
gatherings of more than 6 people under Law No. 6 of 1894 of the Transvaal (36) .
In fact for several days no more miners did come out on strike. The strikers were,
perhaps, waiting to see what effect their actions would have on mine management
and the Chamber of Mines (TCM). The strike committee was divided on the issue.
On the 28th of June the president of the TMA, Twomey, the secretary of the TMA,
T. Matthews, and the president of the Federation conferred with the strike committee
and warned them against spreading the strike any further (37). The officials
primary concern was financial but they must have also been worried about the
strike movement getting out of control.
The strike committee made arrangements for a mass meeting of strikers in Benoni
Market Square on 29 June. According to the police report the trade union officials
intentions were to gather enough strikers together to attack the New Kleinfontein
mine. It is not possible to prove or disprove this accusation. Calling a mass
meeting was in itself no evidence of intent to incite violence. In most strikes
such meetings are used by officials to maintain links with the strikers, to main-
tain control and direction and prevent demoralisation and fragmentation of the
movement.
The meeting was contrary to the notice prohibiting gatherings posted on 20 June
but General Smuts gave permission for it to be held after representations from
Madeley, a Labour Party MLA, who promised that there would be no violence. Al-
though the meeting was orderly at first, there was a sudden rush of the crowd
toward the New Kleinfontein mine. Police reports on the actions of the strike
leaders conflict somewhat. According to one report tfie"leaders did all they could
to prevent the crowd going to the mine. According to another report J.T. Bain
was prominent in urging on the strikers (38). The police had prepared for any
crowd action and protected the mine with bayonets at the ready (39).
35 ibid. Statement of Carl Davies Manager of Brakpan C29.
36 ibid SAP Evidence Q439
37 R.D.M. 1.7.13
38 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q&01-22 Q1563
39 ibid
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From 29 June the situation of confrontation escalated. The government obtained
permission to use imperial troops almost 3 000 of whom were sent to the Rand
from 30 June onwards (40). On the 1st July a band of strikers went to the
Simmer Pan power station Germiston and had no difficulty in persuading the men to
come out on strike (41). The white workers at the Rose Deep gold mine balloted
and decided to come out if the Federation called a general strike. Bands of
strikers were busy up and down the reef persuading the workers to join them on
strike. On the 1st July a band of strikers and women marched from Benoni to
Boksburg to call out the East Rand Proprietary Mines workers. There a verbal
battle ensued, the mens1 leaders attempted to persuade the men to come out while
the management attempted to persuade them to stay in, and George Farrar of the
TCM motored from one mine to another of the group trying to persuade the men not
to strike. Despite his efforts white workers in the four mines of the group struck
work on the 2nd of July (42). An attempt was made on the 2nd July to blow up the
steel standard carrying electric power to the Apex mine. If this had been success-
ful it would have meant that there would have been no power for the Apex or
New Kleinfontein mines or Benoni town (43), Considering the availability of
dynamite to the strikers and the' vulnerability of goldmining plant it is perhaps
surprising that this tactic was hardly attempted and instead the strikers stuck
to the traditional tactic of calling on the support of their fellows.
By the second of July the white workers on 20 gold mines, the Simmer Power Station
and some on the Victoria Falls Power Company works had struck work - a total of
nearly 5 000 workers. At this stage the TMA decided to re assert control of a
developing movement. They resolved on a general strike without a ballot from the
fourth of July. The Federation supported this call and pledged themselves to call
out workers in other industries.With the TMA and the Federation taking official
control of the situation the original strike committee was to disband (44).
The TMA executive endorsed the tactic of the strike committee in sending bands
of strikers round the mines but insisted there must be no violence and the pump-
men must not be called out. This was in response to the actions of strikers -
who had raided the Anglo Deep mine, seizing the special constables, destroying
their warrants, and pulled out the pumpmen so that the mine was now flooding (45).
By the 5th of July all mines were affected and 19 000 White workers were on
strike (46). As the Rand Daily Mail wrote, the policy had achieved "amazing
success" and had the "wholehearted" support of the men" (47).
On the fourth of July all trade unions affiliated to the Federation were supposed
to come out on strike. This included the Mason's Society, the Boilermakers,
Engineers, Coopers, Painters, Blacksmiths, Carpenters and Joiners, Tailors,
Typographical and Tramway Employees trade unions. Many of these worked on. the
mines and had already come out, some joined on the 4th**of July and others were
pulled out by strikers. The Federation also passed a resolution calling on the
railway workers to support them, however they met with little response (48).
40 'Correspondence Relating To the Disorders on the Witwatersrand between the
Governor General and the Secretary of State1 - in DC 142 5115.
41 RDM 4.7.13
42 ibid 2.7.13
43 Disturbances Commission Evidence of Chief Engineer New Kleinfontein Q6963
44 RDM 2.7.13
45 Disturbances Commission B20. Magistrate to Secretary for Justice 3.7.13
46 ibid B4
47 RDM 1.7.13
48 'Justice' 193 3/18/12 Annual Conference of ASRHS Bloemfontein August 1913
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The Federation sent notification to the Town Clerk that they would not call out
municipal employees engaged on "essential services" (49).
Mass Meeting July 4th:
The TMA called a mass meeting in Johannesburg on the fourth of July at 2 p.m.
Strikers came in from all over the Reef, some of them on trains that had been
specially provided. At 11 p.m. General Smuts notified the magistrate and police
that the meeting was to be prohibited (50). People had already gathered in the
market square when notices of prohibition were being posted up. The magistrate
interviewed members of the strike committee, Matthews and Watson, and informed
them of the ban. They promised to help the authorities (51). By 2 p.m. several
thousand people had gathered- The evidence of witnesses to the Disturbances
Commission is so contradictory it is impossible to trace a single thread of
events. There was general agreement that the strike leaders spoke to the crowd
and tried to persuade them to disperse but were shouted down (52). But there are
many versions of what happened after that. From the number of police injured
it is clear that evidence that missiles were thrown at them is correct though
it is impossible to say at what stage of the rioting of the 4th and 5th of July
this occured. Despite police evidence that they had been shot on before they
retaliated by firing and that they continued to be fired on,out of 166 police and
troops injured out 3 suffered bullet wounds (53). Out of 21 civilians killed
on the fourth and fifth of July 20 died from bullet wounds.
The troops were lined up in force around the square.According to the Rand Daily
Mail and a solicitor who was sightseeing from a balcony the cavalry charged
fiercely through the crowd with swords drawn. The police deny that any charge took
place at all (54). The crowd did not disperse until they had been shot at by
the troops. From then on the centre of Johannesburg was thronged with rioters
until the early hours of the morning. The strikes "pulled out" the tramway men.
According to police reports various strike leaders including Mary Fitzgerald and
Ward addressed a meeting of the strikers in the evening and urged them to arm
themselves to protect themselves from the police and troops (55). The crowd
rampaged through Johannesburg looting gunshops. They burnt down the offices of
the 'Star' newspaper and Park Station. They then proceeded to the Corner House.
But the authorities had anticipated this move and the corner house was well protected
by dragons. According to a ciD report the crowd threatening the Corner House
refused to disperse even when several volleys were fired into the air, thinking
that only blanks were being fired, so the dragoons fired into the crowd for two
to three minutes (56). By 2 a.m. the town was more or less quiet again. The
next morning, however, the crowd gathered again, this time around the Rand Club.
This was protected by troops ready to fire on anyone wTio approached. Reinforce-
ments armed with rifles arrived and occupied the Club. The crowd was ordered to
disperse or force would be used. Several witnesses testify that the crowd refused
to disperse, people shouting out that they would when the troops dispersed (57),
The evidence is again contradictory. The police claim that they did not fire
until fired on, other witnesses claiming the opposite (58). When the shooting
49 Disturbances Commission. Evidence Town Clerk Q5667
50 Resident Magistrate Q1164
51 ibid pi170
52 ibid Assistant Magistrate 01762
53 ibid Deputy Commissioner SAP Q 2082
54 Rand Daily Mail 5.7.13 Disturbances Commission Q 9300
55 Disturbances Commission - evidence of SAP Q3140-3152
56 Disturbances Commission - evidence of SAP C10 Q3069-3126
57 Commission Evidence of A. Dunbar S. Steinwurtzel 06689
58 e.g. SAP Q4212 Solicitor Q9317
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started the crowd fell back, some hid in doorways and recesses to keep out of
the line of fire. People who attempted to reach the injured lying in the road-
way and gutter were shot at by the troops (59). -
Apart from the shoting and looting the town was in chaos. Because of the strike
no trains were running and there was no lighting. General tJmuts and Prime Minister
Botha after consultation with the Chamber of Mines on the terms they were willing
to offer consulted the strike committee and draw up a truce agreement which provided
for full reinstatement, compensation to victims of the rioting, compensation
to the strikebreakers, no victimisation, and a provision for the Federation to
submit to the Government grievances drawn up by the tradeunions. The Government
decided to pay the strikebreakers one years pay and gave them a free railway
ticket to any station in the union with police protection when they left the
mines (60). The government appointed a magistrate to enquire into cases for
compensation. The only people who would be considered for compensation would be
(a) People who had no part in any unlawful acts on the fourth and fifth of
July and were not spectators of these acts who had been injured through the use
of firearms by the police or military (b) Dependants of people in category (a)
who had been killed
The Federation complained about the terms saying the scope of the enquiry was
far less than they had been promised ((61).
SECTION 2
1913 Strike - Negotiation - The Attitude of the Management and Government Towards.
Trade Unions and The Strike
From the first the management of the New Kleinfontein mine refused to negotiate with
the strike committee. As the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Dalrymple, wrote
in a letter to the Inspector of White Labour, such a move would set a precedent
which would affect the whole gold mining industry. (60). The recognition of
trade unions was not only seen to involve an encroachment on managerial authority
but would also constitute an encouragment to the white workers to become members
. of trade unions. Dalymple was quite open to the commission of Enquiry in
admitting that the mine would prefer to employ all non-union men (61).
The Acting Inspector of White Labour, Steyn, part of whose functions included
mediating in industrial disputes involving white workers, and the undersecretary
f for Mines, Blundell interviewed Dalrymple on the 29th^gf May, the day after
the strike commenced, showed him a telegram from Cape Town which indicated that
the Minister wanted the management to yield on the question of hours and deprive
the strikers.of their.excuse for striking (62). The implications of this being
that the unrest ran deeper and the^ issues were wider than the immediately
predisposing cause of the strike and that for management to yield this point
would weaken the strikers' cause by undermining their moral position and decreasing
public support. According to Steyn the chairman Dalrymple took the telegram to
59 e.g. Disturbances Commission Evidence of Commercial Traveller
60 MNW 238 mm 1779/13
61 'Justice1 Box 164 3/541/13
62 ditto I.W.L. Q 48-45
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show to the Transvaal Chamber of Mines (TCM). Later Steyn wrote to Dalrymple
suggesting that the directors of the company should meet the strike committee and
set a precedent for once and for all in the gold mining industry of conferring with
trade union officials. Dalrymple wrote the mines department before placing Steyn's
letter before his Board asking if Steyn's letter had been sent with the approval
of the government. On the 8th June Blundell wrote and told Dalrymple that Steyn
had gone further than authorized by the Minister - who wants the company to
meet the employees accompanied by anybody elected by then, irrespective of
whether or not they elect trade union officials (63). As the workers were almost
bound to elect trade union officials Dalrymple did not feel that this demand was
very different from that suggested by Steyn and wrote back that under no circum-
stances would they meet trade union officials, adding cuttingly, that if the
government thought this was the correct policy why did they not recognise the
trade unions of government employees (64).
At the end of MaVj with the strike only a few days old,the Minister considered
the possibility of prosecuting the management for contravening the Industrial
Dispute Act. However the Attorney General warned that it was useless to attempt
a presecution as the act did not prescribe any penalty for contravening the
relevant clause (65). A little while later the Commissioner of Police controlling
the police forces in the area also suggested prosecuting the management and if
there was no settlement after that it would be feasible to prosecute the strike
"agitators" for inciting to violence and contravening the Industrial Disputes
Act (66). No arrests were made until much later in June. The authorities at
first^  no doubt^were wary of arresting strike leaders for fear of inflaming the
situation particularly if no action was taken against the management who had
initially contravened the act.
In view of the refusal of the management to negotiate with the strike committee
a number of people became involved in trying to reach a settlement including the
TCM, the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the Deputy Mayor of Benoni and various
government officials. The Deputy Mayor of Benoni had offered his services as a
mediator from the beginning. After refusing Steyn's plea to meet the strike
committee Dalrymple, in consultation with the TCM, sent a letter to the Deputy
Mayor thanking him for his and setting out the terms on which they would agree
to a settlement (67). They agreed to reinstate all the men and to revert to the
old hours for the mechanics. However the strike committees demands had escalated
to include the abolition of Saturday afternoon work for everybody. Anyway the
strike committee refused to consider the offer sent via the Deputy Mayor because
it had not been addressed directly to them.
Towards the end of May talk of increasing the demands T o include a demand for an
8 hour bank to bank became general in Benoni (68).When Steyn interviewed the strike
committee on the 29th of May some of them put forward this demand. Bain asked Steyn
to submit a proposal to the minister to pass a bill on an 8 hour bank to bank to
prevent an industrial conflagation* (69). The Inspector did not do this. Instead
he telegraphed the Minister suggesting that the government form wage boards to
get over the problem of management refusing, to recognise trade union officials (70),
63 Disturbances Commission Dalrymple Q7136
64 ditto Exhibit - correspondence between Steyn, Dalrymple and Secretary for Mines
65 ditto Evidence of Under Secretary Mines Q285. This clause provided for the
giving of one month's notice before changes in wages or conditions could be
implemented.
66 'Justice' Box 165. ruter Commissioner SAP to Attorney General 3.6.13
67 'MNW1 Box 165 'Labour Report' May 1913
68 Disturbance Commission Steyn 0 298
69 Disturbances Commission Steyn 0104-111
70 ibid Q141
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General Smuts instructed the assistant magistrate of Benoni to write to Bain, sec-
retary of the strike committee and offer his services as a mediator. The
magistrate wrote, signed himself without his official designation and "made it
very clear that my action in no way involved the Government" (71) . Clearly the
Government was also wary of giving any overt recognition to the strike committee.
Bain replied that the strike committee was always prepared to negotiate but only
directly with management, not through an intemediary.
After the white workers of the Van Ryn came out on strike on the nineteenth of
June Bain, Mason, Tole and Brown were arrested under the Industrial Disputes Act
for in incitement to strike(72)On the 21st when the New Modderfontein workers
struck Dingwall and Kendall were arrested (73) . After the first arrests about a
thousand people marched to the charge office and demanded the release of the strike
leaders (74). There was some stone throwing but the crowd readily dispersed when
ordered to (75). The leaders were allowed out on bail. The trial was postponed
until the ninth of July, which fell after the strike settlement between the
strike committee and Botha and Smuts. It is impossible to say what would have
happened if these strike leaders had been refused bail for the course of the
strike. I discuss later the militancy of the strikers and the reasons for the
strike. One of these was the demand of the workers to have trade union leaders
recognised. The detention of these leaders in jail may well have inflammed to
situation and new leaders would have been produced. According to eome people's
view the general strike was the result of intimidation of workers by mobs led by
trade union leaders (76). When the cases come up for trial the men were released
supposedly as part of the strike agreement but one can also assume that the
authorities would have been cautious about proceeding with the prosecutions in
view of the contriving unrest on the Rand (77) . Others whose trials came up to-
wards the end of 1913 were not so fortunate. Sentences of form 2 to 5 years were
passed on people accused of being involved in the burning of Park Station,
shops in Benoni and of assaulting the police. (78).
After the employers ultimatum on the ninth of June the Kleinfontein employees
voted overwhelmingly to remain on strike (79). At this stage Bain believed that
the men would return to work if the company would concede the stoppage of aj.1
work at 12.30 a.m. on Saturdays. The Minister, when informed of this view; urged
the directors of the company to adopt this way out but they replied that any
material change in the working arrangements at the Kleinfontein would lead to a
demand for similar changes at other mines (80).
The Government did not play a conspicious role in negotiations or any actions to
reach a settlement. They advised the company on ways out of the impasse but did
not put pressure on them to accept the advice. Their ^initial concern was the
effect the strike would have on the black workers on the mine who had no work
because of the strike. With Ministerial approval the Director of Native Labour
instructed the management of the mine on the day the strike began that all black
workers must be paid in full and the time counted against the period of their
contracts (81). The management of the company wanted to pay decreased rates and
asked the Director of Native labour for his co-operation in persuading the
black workers but he refused (82). At the beginning of July, when the strike was
rapidly spreading, the Government took steps to prevent further recruiting of blacks
for the Rand Mines. Telegrams were sent to Magistrates instructing them to re-
fuse passes to blacks and to decline to attent contracts until the unrest on the
Rand was over. The embargo on recruiting lasted until the fourth of August (83).
71 'Justice' Box 166 3/541/13 Assistant Magistrate Benoni to Secretary Justice 26.6.13
72 Disturbances Commission SAP Evidence Q.472
73 ibid Q.491
74 ibid Q476
75 ibid Q.479
76 e.g. Disturbances Commission Steyn Q 235
77 MNW Box 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
78 'Justice1 192 3/35/14
79 Disturbances Commission Report
80 Disturbances Commission Exhibits A10, AlOa, N
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On the twenty second of June, after the strike had begun to spread. Smuts and
Department of Mines representatives met representatives of the New Kleinfontein
Van Ryn, New Modderfontein strike committee. The interview produced no fruitful
results. The strike committee insisted that all the strikebreakers must be dis-
missed, which the management refused to do on the grounds that they had obligations
towards them, and Chat all police protection must be removed (84) .
It was the employment of strike breakers and the states action in providing pro-
tection for these strikebreakers that inflamed the situation. Despite their pro-
testations the government clearly did not maintain a neutral position. As soon
as the strike began extra police were drafted to Benoni. After the eleventh of
June when strikebreakers were first engaged, police escorts were provided for
vehicles coming into Benoni (85). Police escorted strike breakers in to the
mines, sometimes as many as 80 police protected 40 strike breakers (86). As the
strike spread all available police and SAMR were drafted to Johannesburg and the
Reef. By the fourth of July the day of the fatalmass meeting in Johannesburg
there were one thousand armed police in Johannesburg (87). On the thirtieth of
June Smuts applied to the Governor General for permission to employ imperial
Troops. At this stage the strike was beginning to spread rapidly. By the fifth
of July nearly 3 000 cavalry and infantry had been sent to Johannesburg and the
Reef (88) . Up to the fourth of July Smuts avoided the government or its forces
- taking a central role. He permitted the meeting of the twenty ninth of June
*• and seemingly only decided at the last moment to prohibit the meeting of the 4th
July. The officer in command of the troops consulted the chief magistrate and
the commissioner SAP in Johannesburg on the fourth July and decided to keep the
troops out of view. When they heard that the meeting was banned they decided
instead to line up the troops in a mass on the Market Square (89) . It seems
that the government had hoped that the strike would not spread. The Union Defence
forces were in the midst of reorganising and were not available in sufficient
numbers to suppress the strike. When the strike spread so rapidly Smuts re-
quisitioned Imperial troops. On the fourth of July when it was clear that a
violent confrontation would be inevitable if the meeting was prohibited Smuts
gave J.p. Fitzpatrick permission to organise an armed defence force of "leading
citizens" (90).
After the strike had been suppressed and the government had negotiatied with the
strike committee, the trade unions, through not officially recognised, had obtained
a temporary defacto recognition. In terms of the strike agreement both sides
agreed that there would be no victimisation. However soon after work recommenced
the management complained that the strikers were refusing to work with certain
... men they called scabs. The government had only compensated strikebreakers
'^ who had been brought in after the strike began. As far as the workers were
concerned anyone who worked during the strike was a scab. Smuts and the Minister
of Mines went to Benoni on the eleventh of July and pleaded with the Federation
leaders to use their influence to get strikers to resume work with the scabs (91).
After the strike the minister of Mines met representatives of the goldmining
.81 'Native Affairs1 Box 5 mm 1870/13/F/2
82 ibid
83 ibid Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary for Justice 6,12.13
84 Disturbances Commission Evidence of Commissioner SAP
85 Commission SAP Q528
86 ditto District Commandant SAP Boksburg Q1453
87 ditto Commission SAP, Tuter, Q1371
88 DC 142 file 5.115. Correspondence of Governor Relating to recent disorders
89 Commission Evidence of O.C. 0.5651
90 Commission Evidence of J.P. Fitzpatrick
91 MNW 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
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companies who agreed to authorize managements to meet officials of the TMA if
disputes occured. The employers agreed to do this pending legislation on the
registration and incorporation of trade unions (93). After the strike the
Department of Mines received deputations from the Federation and the trade unions
and discussed proposed industrial legislation with them (94).
Immediately after the strike the trade unions and the Federation achieved temporarily
the recognition which they had sought.
From the evidence of the manager and chairman of the board of directors of the
New Kleinfontein and the Inspector of White Labour it is clear that the intransigence
of the New Kleinfontein on the question of recognition arose from the knowledge
that this would set a precedent which would affect the whole gold industry. How-
ever this does not answer the question of why the gold mining industry should
have been so anti-union at a time when management in the metropolis and in Western
Europe after pressure and militant action from trade unions increasingly recognised
trade unions and sometimes dealt solely through them. Part of the answer lies in
the kind of capital which is invested in the colonies. It is invested in the
colonies rather than the imperial nation because of the possibilities of the ex-
ploitation of cheap labour. In order to attain this it is necessary that the cap^
italists through the management maintain as much control over the labour force
as possible so that it can be exploited as much as possible and deployed in the
most profitable way. This is clearly what happened in the case of the gold
mining industry of South Africa. As explained in the introduction this demanded
an exceptionally cheap labour force.
93 MNW 234 mm 1074/14
94 'Justice* 178 3/1418/13 Reports of Secretary for Mines
V *:
- 12 -
SECTION 3
Grievances Submitted by Trade Unions and the Employer Reply
In terms of the agreement between the government and the trade unions of t:.e fifth
o± July the Federation submitted a list of demands to the government on behalf of
the white workers. There was an expectation that the government itself would in-
troduce measures to effect some of the demands rather than risk a repetition of
the riots of July. At the conference between the Government and the Federation
from the 22nd to the 24th July the Federation representatives offered to drop all
their demands if the government would call a general election (100). To make
such a demand the Federation must have thought that confidence in the Government
had been very much undermined. They must have hoped for a new government that
would be more amenable towards trade unions and labour reform. The Government
did not resign but instead using a well tried 'cooling' device offered to appoint a
commission to investigate their demands.
The demands forwarded by the Federation on behalf of the white trade union in-
cluaea:-
1. Introduction of 8 hour day
2. Establishment of a minimum wage
J
 3. Abolition of Sunday work
4. Payment for public holidays
5. The gradual abolition of imported, indentured labour
6. Repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act
7. Factory Act
8. Repeal of Law No.6 of 1894 under which the magistrate had forbidden gather-
ings of more than 6.
9. Consolidation of mines' sickness and benefit societies
10. Workmen's compensation act.
11. 8 hour bank to bank
12. Increased wage for mineworkers
13. Establishment of fully indentured apprenticeship system.
14. Abolition of piecework in all government departments.
15. Permanent Railway Enquiry Board with equal representation of Administration
and employees.
16. Recognition of trade unions. (101).
If all these demands could have been implemented it would have meant a change in
the whole structure of industry in South Africa. The gold mining industry had
been built up on and depended on a continuing supply 67, cheap blacks labour (102).
Several demands echoed those which were being made in Europe - no Sunday Labour
payment for public holidays and, most important, 8 hour day.
The Government's reply was not what the Federation had anticipated. It conceded
nothing. The reply agreed;
1 0 0
 a/5/ P' C r e s w e 1 1 s P e e c h in House in reply to Smuts, against indemnity Bill -
9/2/14 published .as "The Attempt to Crush Labour" - page 25.
101 Government Gazett August 1913 p. 1213
102 see Johnstone op. cit.
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1. To appoint a commission consisting of one representative of the mineworkers,
one of the other workers, one of the mine owners and a chairman nominated by
- the government to discuss.
(a) 8 hour day
(b) Industrial Dispute Act
(c) Sunday work
(d) Imported and indentured labour
(e) Wage Board
2. For railway and harbour workers a separate commission was proposed, composed
of three members - one representing the white workers, one the administration
and a chairman appointed by the government.
3. As far as the other demands were concerned an opportunity must be given for
representative bodies of employers to make representations to the government
before any legislative stops could be taken.
4. The mineworkers demands are for the mineowners to deal with (103).
The gist of this reply is that no immediate concessions would be made and that any
future concessions would depend on the strength of trade unions to force them.
In their reply the TCM refused 8 hours bank to bank, and refused a wage increase.
They agreed to 8i hours bank to bank, conceded 10 days holiday on half pay after
twelve months continuous work underground or two years on the surface. As far
as the mineworkers were concerned no doubt they were anxious to get any holiday.
As far as the TCM was concerned the granting of a paid holiday is clearly good
policy considering the health risks mineworkers ran and the benefits phthisis
victims were entitled to under the Phthisis Act. On this score they also agreed
to the demand from underground drill sharpener that a workplace must be sanitary
and well ventilated (104). The TCM agreed to the recognition of trade unions
but only on certain conditions. The unions must not have a fund for political
purposes e.g. sponsoring parliamentary candidates, only mine employees would be
allowed to make representations to the employers, trade unions can have no say in
management or discipline i.e. hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, retrenching etc,
and that any minority of employees can make representation to the management with-
out going through the trade union.
These terms of recognition would have limited the role of trade unions. One of
the principle reasons for wanting the trade unions recognised and for wanting to
be able to negotiate through full time officials was the fear of workers that
any worker who asserted himself in making demands on submitting grievances would
be liable to be victimised. The TCM insistence that <->piy trade unionsts who
were employed by the mines could negotiate with management would have obviated
this. If the last clause was followed and employers encouraged employees to
ignore the trade union officials then the union would be weakened and find it
difficult to unite the workers. The TCM refused to recognise the Federation,
to whom most of the mining trade unions were affiliated. In the TCM opinion:-
"The real cause of the strike is to be found in the desire of the Feder-
ation of Trade Unions to be recognised by the mining industry as the
sole medium for the settlement of disputes between employers and em-
ployees. To this, the industry will not agree" (105)
103 Government Gazette August 1913 p. 1213
104 ibid
105 TCM Annual Report 1913
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The Government offered similar terms for the recognition of the railway workers'
union - the Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants (ASRHS) (106).
The demands of the trade unions were then sent via the Federation to the employers1
organisations. The National Federation of Building Trade Employers agreed to
several demands - such as the abolition of piecework, payment for public holidays,
48 hour week etc. In fact, as they pointed out in their reply, most of the de-
mands had already been conceded in the new working rules drawn up by the employers
and the Federation in May 1913. (107). They still refused to implement a closed
shop which had been demanded then-. The Master Tailors in their reply to the
S.A. Tailors and Tailoresses Union agreed on the principle of a Factory Act and
Wage Boards to determine minimum wages, they agreed on many demands including a
48 hour week. The Master Bakers refused the demand for 8 hours and for El per day.
But they agreed to restrict "kaffir" labour to making "kaffir" bread and general
unskilled work. This would not have been much of a hardship considering a
large proportion of the work would have been producing bread for the mines (108).
The Master Printers agreed to increase pay to £6 per week, but refused a 48 hour
week, they also refused to increase overtime rates and refused 14 days paid
holiday a year.
The Federation did not achieve the results it had hoped for. The better organised
workers obtained some concessions. But there was to be no legislative entrench-
ment on 8 hour day, minimum wage, indentured labour, or the recognition of trade
unions. They rejected the governments and the employers' replies as "inadequate"
and threatened to call a strike to enforce them. The Federation refused to
participate in the general commission offered by the Government. The Government
instead appointed a commission to investigate the position of white workers, as
far as wages, standard of living, hours of work and condition of work were con-
cerned. This commission reported in January 1914 after the strike. The Railway
Commission was formed towards the end of the year and did not report until the
second half of 1914.
106 Smuts "The Syndicalist Conspiracy in SA1 speech in house 4,5 February 1914
107 MNW 192 mm 2583 13 National Building Employers1 reply 28.8.13
108 ibid Replies of Master Tailors, Master Baker, Master Printer (all Transvaal)
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.. 1913 - The Military of the Strikers
For the first two weeks of the strike there was general agreement amongst the
strike leaders of the TMA and the Federation that the strike should be confined
to the New Kleinfontein mine. No attempts were made at this stage to spread
the strike. Strikers visited other mines to speak to the white workers about
their grievances and to collect contributions to the strike fund (110). Amongst
trade unionists there was some disagreement as to tactics leaders such as Crawford
of the ASE, who espoused 'direct action1 as part of the struggle for socialism,
urged the strikers to be militant, to sabotage and destroy machinery (111). The
leaders of the TMA and the SA Engine Driver and Firemen's Association (SAED, FA)
dissociated themselves from such tactics (112).
After the New Kleinfontein resumed operations the strikers became more militant
and persuaded the white workers on neighbouring mines, the New Modderfontein
and the Van Ryn, to join the strike in sympathy. The trade union leaders were
still divided. Prominent officials in the TMA, such as the" President, Tooney
and the Secretary, T. Matthews, and the President of the Federation opposed
this and warned against spreading the strike (113). Others, such as Bain,
Crawford, Mason, Brown and Tole played a leading role in spreading the strike.
D. Simons of the TMA had initially sided with the moderates but when the fence
,• -was being erected on the New Kleinfontein to protect strike breakers he was
prominent in trying to induce the black workers to join the strike (114).
On the second of July the moderates of the TMA decided to try to regain leadership
of a movement which was outpacing them. According to T. Matthews, when the TMA
met on the second of July to discuss the situation they received words from many
parts of the Reef that the workers wanted to strike (115). A strike leader inter-
viewed by the Rand Daily Mail said that "every mine in the Transvaal has its
grievance. It is not a strike, it is a revolt. The men know that it is a
sympathetic strike and that they are not being controlled or led, but that they
are making a gigantic effort on their own. They are fighting practically with-
out funds" (116).
Lack of funds soon became an additional reason for the desperation and militancy
of the strikers. They hoped for a quick, decisive vitory once all the white
workers joined the strike and the gold mining industry was brought to a standstill,
The banning of the meeting on the fourth of July, the shooting of strikers by the
police and troops and the fact that, apart from the gold miners, few white workers
/' joined the general strike were the proximate reasons f^jr. the rioting of the
- fourth and fifth of July.
110 Commission e.g. see evidence of Carl Davies Manager Brakpan mines
111 'Justice' Box 165. SAP reporf Market Square meeting 26.5.13
112 ibid
113 RDM 1.7.13
114 Commission Assistant Magistrate Boksburg
115 RDM 2.7.13
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In their evidence to the Disturbances Commission many witnesses state their belief
that the events of the evening of the fourth of July, the burning of Part Station
the Star office and the attempted attack on the Corner House were the actions .
of "hooligans" (117). However, one must explain why, when Johannesburg was in
uproar and the authorities had lost control of much of it, these targets were
chosen and why hooligans should concentrate on raiding gunshops and not take ad-
vantage of the lucrative opportunities for looting (118). The choice of these
targets is an indication of the involvement of strikers'in the attacks. The
strikers had reason to attack Park Station after their efforts to persuade the
railwaymen to join the strike had failed. The strikers also had reason to attack
the 'Star1 offices. In the words of the Rand Daily Mail>which the strike committee
praised as the only paper which had given accurate reports of the strike. "The Star1 "is
controlled as is the 'Leader* by those who have always exacted from editors and
others the most implicit obedience ... There is always but one alternative for
those who presume to question the wisdom and condemn the stupidity of the Chamber
of Mines and that is the sack".
The article goes on to explain how the TCH .had used various pressures to get the
Mail to toe the line; and continued:
"Let the public consider what sort of latitude they are likely to accord
their own employees when this is the policy they pursue to those who are
independent of them" (120)
On the fourth of July in Market Square the crowd refused to listen to trade unionists,
such as Morgan, who pleaded with them to disperse as the meeting had been banned
He was hoQted down (121). After the truce agreement had been signed the strike
leaders had great difficulty in persuading the waiting crowd to accept the terms.
In the words of the Governor General ;
"The police and the strike leaders we doing all they can to persuade the
men to go home and return to work tomorrow" (122).
At a mass meeting outside the Trades Hall W.H. Andrew, Mason, Dingwall and J.T. Bain
spoke and urged acceptance of the terms. To shouts of disapproval Crawford ad-
vocated calling off the strike for one month while grievances were being considered.
Along with Kendall and Fitzgerald, Crawford then spoke against returning to work
and instead called for a continuation of the strike until demands had been fully
conceded (123).
Unrest continued on the Rand. On the seventh of July there was a large meeting of
non trade union men in Johannesburg (124). Waterston of the Engine Drivers Union
and SALP, addressed them urging them to join unions. I&jndall and other speakers
abused the strike leaders and said they had let down the non-union men by pulling
them out and then accepting an agreement which was merely a bluff and achieved
nothing for the men. The funeral of the people shot dead on the fourth
and fifth was held on the seventh of July.
117 Commission e.g. SAP 02561
118 Evening Chronicl 12.7.13
120 RDM 11.7.13
121 Commission Magistrate Buckle 0172
122 Governor General Correspondence relating to disturbances on the Rand 8.7.13
123 The News 7.7.13 Published by SATU on behalf of Federation
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According to a police report;
"the crowd at the funeral has taken up an ugly attitude and many strikers are
unwilling to accept the terras agreed to by their leaders" (125). .
Unrest continued in Benoni, which had been the centre of the strike. On the sixth
of July the railway station and several houses in Benoni were burnt down (126).
On eighth of July the Officer commanding the military forces in Benoni decided
that "no men should be withdrawn from any mine until strikers return to work as
isolated attempts damage property still being made". On the 18th of July the
Commissioner of police asked for 30 mounted police from SAMR to patrol Benoni
throughout the night until further notice (127).
The strikers returned to work after the funeral, perhaps dissatisfied with the
agreement but with their unity broken, some favouring the agreement and some
wanting to continue until specific demands had been conceded. Mines Department
officials kept in touch with the situation and warned of the danger of the contin-
uing unrest breaking out into another strike (128). As the weeks passed the
lack of gains, considering the sacrifices of the strike, became apparent. The
moderate leaders were anxious to retain the recognition they had temporarily
received and did not want to display extremist tendencies. Government officials
became alarmed at the growing importance of the "extremists" in the trade union
movement and what they saw as the permeation of their views throughout the rank
and file (129). In September there were several short stoppages of work on
several mine some of them were due to the refusal of trade unionists to work with
non-union men (130). In December the minister was warned that it was possible
that the New Kleinfontein men would shortly strike demanding a"closed shop" and
increased wages (131). On the thirtieth of December the Minister of Mines met
officials of the TMA and warned them that the refusal of members to work with
non-members was a breach of the July agreement. They claimed that they had tried
to stop action against non-union men but were unable to stop it as the men felt
so strongly on the issue (132). In his correspondance with the Minister from
July onwards the Secretary for Mines insisted that the government must not relax
the preparations it had begun in case of a further strike. In his view another
strike would be the result of actions by "agitators" and that if sufficient force
was used to "protect" the workers they would not feel intimidated and would feel
safe in staying at work. (133).
From his viewpoint the workers in 1913 were intimidated into striking by a minority
of extremists. This provides the rationalisation for providing large forces to
"protect" workers from strikers. One might argue that the presence of armed
forces would intimidate the workers and discourage them from striking.
125 SAMR 1028 305
126 MNW 238 mm 1779/13 Strike Diary
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SECTION 5
1913 - The Reasons for the Strike
It is always very difficult to understand the exact constellation of circumstances
that leads workers to strike. It is never sufficient to look solely at the
proximate cause. Even in a strike like the 1913 one where the trade union formulated
a long list of grievances one cannot say that this exhausts the reasons for the
strike, m the background to any strike is the basic conflict between workers
and capital. in the 1913 strike the autocracy of the TCM and the centralization
or policy and control in the goldmining industry may have been important con-
tributory causes.
It is necessary to try to assess why the strike occured on the New Kleinfontein
in the first place, why it spread as it did, and why the strike took the form
that it did.
Autocracy of ManaaemRni-
^ + . ^ °
n t h e N S W K l e i n f o n t e i n
 ^ose out of a change in working conditions
that affected only a small proportion of the mineworkers. The underground and
-surface workers struck as a result of the attempted abolition of a privilege of
a few mechanics which they did not themselves enjoy. The action seems therefore
to have been against the autocracy of the decision, made without notification,
much less consultation. This view is supported by the refusal of the workers to
go back to work after the managements' promise to return to the 'status quo ante1
made m their letter to the Mayor of Benoni. The strike committee refused to
consider the offer because the management had by-passed them and the workers
followed the strike committee's instructions. Although this did not figure
directly in the demands made there is a lot of evidence that employment on the
mines was very unstable. According to the Economic Commission appointed by the
government in September 1913, which reported on the seventeenth of January 1914,
the turnover of men on the mines was very high and many of these changes were
not made on the initiative of the men (134). Using Government Mining Engineer
figures from January to June 1911 they show that of 22,180 white workers employed
on 53 mines 17,7 54 changes of employment were made in that period, an average
of 13.3% per month (135). Apart from the inclination of some sections of white •
miners to move about in their employment, particularly contractors who were
always looking for good contracts (136), the main reasons for the instability was
. the dismissal of workers considered inefficient and the frequent changes of
management. When managers moved from one mine to another they usually bought with
them a number of workers from the old mine and dismissed any excess workers
from the new mine (137). Out of 58 managers in. office in August 1913 one had been
appointed in 1901, one in 1903, one in 1907, five in 1909, fifteen in 1910, seven
in 1911, eighteen in 1912 and ten in 1913 (138). According to the Inspector of
Mines for the Boksburg district (which included the Benoni mines) underground
workers were badly treated, being summarily fined or dismissed without trial and
with no means of appeal (139). In demanding the recognition of trade unions the
workers may have been attempting to obtain some control over conditions. In
striking in 1913 the New Kleinfontein workers were reacting against summary treat-
ment, the change of management may have acted as a catalyst in an inflammatory
situation.
134 Economic Commission UG12 1913 p. 39
135 ibid
136 Contractors comprised about one eighth of the total number of white workers in
June 1913. UG12'14 para. 106.
137 UG12M4 p. 40
138 ibid
139 MNW 234 mm 1074/14 Inspector Mines report.
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Once the New Kleinfontein began operations successfully the strikers had to try
to spread the strike to have any hope of success. By this stage apart from the
issue of reinstatement of the men and a reversion to their former hours of work
other issues had been raised. As far as trade unionists were concerned the atti-
tude of the management, presumable sanctioned by the TCM, had brought to the fore
the question of the position of trade unions in the industry and the autocratic
methods generally employed in dealing with the white workers, although the TCM
were not anti trade union because of inherent antipathy and had pragmatically
recognised the Engine Drivers Union. The TMA also raised the general question of
hours and was demanding an 8 hour bank-to-bank. This was a change that the TMA,
ASE and ASCJ had been pressing for many months, now they saw an opportunity to
push the issue and mobilize support for the New Kleinfontein strikers around it.
(140). The Inspector of White Labour, the Secretary for Mines and others put the
blame for the spread of the strike on Bain, Crawford.and other trade union
officials whose only concern they believed was to have trade union and the Federa-
tion recognised (141). Of course trade union officials had an interest in having
their union recognised as negotiators. But mineworkers did also when employment
was so unstable and management authoritarian they feared victimisation if they
attempted to seek redness for grievances. According to the Inspector of White
Labour's evidence the miners were anxious and determined that the management
should meet their representatives (142).
Phthisis
The question of the reduction of hours was bound up with a general reaction of
workers to exploitation and also with the problem of phthisis. From 1912 on-
wards the state had taken measures to cause a reduction in the incidence of
phthisis. According to the evidence to a commission in March of a member of the
Medical Advisory Committee of the Miners' phthisis Board up to the end of 1912
the incidence of deaths from phthisis had not decreased but by 1913 it showed
signs of declining (143). In his evidence to the same commission the Government
Mining Engineer talks about a shortage of white miners due to the phthisis scare.
(144).
At a meeting of the strike Committee in Benoni on the 1st July the chairman R.
Haynes, spoke about phthisis and the TMA's determination that when operations
restarted the trade unions must organize and ensure that the incidence of the
disease is reduced to a minimum'(145). In his evidence to the Disturbances
Commission a miner D.P. Roux, who had helped to mobilize the'dutch*speaking
workers, said that phthisis and the-general danger of the work due to the indiffer-
ence of the management about safety, were the reasons for the strike (146).
It seems that, although it was not explicitly stated, the incidence of phthisis was
one of the grievances of the workers and forms part of the general background of
their distrust of management•and resentment at the way they were treated. From
140 MNW 109 mm 823/12 Inspector of White Labour to Secretary for Mines
. 141 Commission Q 235
142 ibid O 160
143 Select Committee on European Employment 1913. Evidence of Dr L.G. Irvine °-950
144 ibid. Evidence of R.N. Kotze 2 Q282
145 RDM 1.7.13
146 Commission D.P. Roux Q 6779
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°"TdS government had called on Afrikaners to scab on the white
= ' ™ s s
They are still going down, "and they will keep on going down until they die
because there is nothing else but starvation in from of them^f they do nit"
(147)
5.3 Long Hours '
q U e S t i
°
n
 °
f
 hours generally was concerned many mine workers felt
resentfurof tntr ^ Tf the" ™ «
After the stride of ^ H * T"" T ^ d ° l n g l l l e g a l ° V e r t i m e underground (150).
the reasons for\hf ? -v fSpec*ors o f M i " " were asked for their opinions on
IZ " ! . s t r l k e- Several of them mentioned long hours. They criticised
crtticis^Vf t e m f ° r p t h i s r e a s o n calli"9 it "voluntary sweating". They also
large sums of ^ C 3 U S e °* *"« di S S a t i s f a c t i°" « caused among other workers when
the ttlTtLl I »«e made by contractors and criticised this also because of
«ZL « ^ engendered in the contractors by the uncertainty of their living
~ : ^
6 y r a d e M f "a96S' in °th« »°«ths they migh/come out in deb?' ,15!).
workers anH ^ conditions on the mines and discourage rivalry between
overtime so '£«*»**'•'***<>***'*** fc"de unions demanded enhanced rates for
overtime so that employers would try to depend on overtime as little as possible
5
 *
4 Insecurlty because of Encroachment by Black Lahnnr-
In their evidence to the Mining Industry Board of ^ F t h e AEU, the Boilermakers
and tlTTU]&erSl ?B R e d u c t i o n W o r k e r s' ^e Building Workers industrial Snion '
reasonef*°
alf-ted Society of Woodworkers in a joint meMorandum v»rote that t ^
u n d e r a ™ • l l x t a^ c y a n d s P r e a , d ° f the 1913 strike was the insecurity of white
underground workers whose jobs were being steadily encroached on by black workers
hill' E c o n o m l c Commission of 1914 claimed that in industry generally there
constant Z7 ^ f ^ T ^ °f Whites bv "lack »°^rs, but! nevertheless "a
l^frf f ° d l sP l a c e m e n t " Prevelant" (154). m his evidence to the
of h i ^ r tS1°,n H' R ° S S S k i n n e r' a director of the ERPM spoke about the ability
nhani °, c e r t a i n classes of work restricted to whites such as rock drilling,
changing and tamping holes, hoisting engines. He also said that in the past five
years the practice of putting one white miner on to 2,3,4 or even 5 drilling
147 SC 1913 Evidence of J.T. Bain Q 3821
148 ibid Q 3815
149 Economic Commission UG 12M4 para 118
150 MNW 109mm 823/12 IWL to Secretary Mines 22.2.13
151 MNW 234 mm 1074/14 Inspector Mines reports September 1913
152 UG 12-14 para 124
153 Mining Industry Board 1922 Memoranda
154 UG 12-14 p. 65
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* machines had increased so that in effect the black man ended up actually running
the machine and the white merely supervised (155). In his evidence Kotze the
Government Mining Engineer, said that the number of machines had greatly in-
creased in the past five years but the number of machiners had remained steady (156),
In his evidence RB Waterston said that actual replacement of whites by blacks
had occured mainly in unskilled occupations but that blacks were learning white
men's skills. For example a hauling engine driver, while suppossedly responsible
for the upkeep of other engines which blacks drive, in fact has too much to do
and the blacks actually not only drive the engine, but also look after the boilers
and manage the haulage (157) Waterston said that the tendency was for the semi-
skilled black, under white supervision, to do work formerly done by whites (158).
Another reason for the strike, also unstated, would seem to have been general un-
rest among white miners caused by the insecurity they felt because of their lack
of control of the industry and the TCM policy of using more cheap black labour.
When the trade unions submitted grievance and demands to the employers they all
included a demand for increased wages. This had never been at the centre of the
struggle. Even so the increase in the lost of living between 1910 and 1914 of
10% without a compensatory increase in wages may have been a contributory factor
to the industrial unrest (159).
6. The Railway men in 1913
The Federation of Trades had hoped that the railway workers would join the general
strike. They had grievances of their own and some favoured joining the strike
(160). When the strike was officially over unrest continued among the workers in
Gerraiston, a railway centre (161). A deputation of about 1 000 railway workers
went to the Governor General's residence on the 5th July to discuss grievances
(162). On the sixth July a meeting of railwaymen in Pretoria voted not to return
to work until after the funerals (163). According to the Evening Chronicle after
the strike the membership of the ASRHS increased rapidly. By the eleventh of
July it had 1 000 members in Pretoria and 6 000 members throughout the Union (164).
Rumours of an inpending railway strike persisted throughout July (165).
. As government employees the railway workers were in a peculiar position. Their
terms of employment were governed by Act of Parliament. A discussion of the posi-
tion and grievances of the railwayraen follows later*
The railwaymen did not strike. But there were signs of closer co-roperation be-
. tween them and the Federation. After the government's reply to the grievances
\ submitted on behalf of trade unions by the Federation TIelegates the Federation
and the ASRHS confered and passed the following resolution:-
"That this meeting of delegates views with disgust the attitude adopted by
the government towards the workers of South Africa and refuses to accept
their suggestions, but will*rely upon our industrial and political organi-
sation to remedy our grievances,and that no general strike be called at
the present juncture", (166).
155 SC13 Q 355
156 ibid O_ 2292-6
157 ibid Q3975
158 ibid Q 3987
159 Mining Industry Board volume 3. T. Matthews evidence,quoting Director of
census statistics.
160 'Justice' 193 3/18/14 Report of Annual Conference of ASRHS 18,19,20 August 1913
161 Governor General Correspondence Relating to the Disturbances on the Rand
162 ibid
163 'The News' 7.7.13
164 Evening Chronicle 11.7.13
165 SAMR 1028 305
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Thus the Federation admitted that grievances still existed but the organi
of White workers was ineffective to remedy the situation. After the stri
trade unions concentrated on strengthening their organisations. The TMA
organisers to Vereenigirig. Witbank and Natal (167). The Federation held
ganda meetings at various places on the Reef, at which they generally adv<
greater organisation, but at which some leaders, such as Crawford, Ander:
Livingstone, Nicholls, spoke of the need for the workers to form an army <
own and meet force by force (168).
7. Government Response to the 1913 Strike -Repression
The Government had been granted permission to use Imperial Troops statione
South Africa to control "the strike and suppress the disturbances. This le
the shooting of workers at the behest of a "Boer" government, politically
controversial act for the Imperial Government to sanction. The Union Gove
was warned that they must not depend on being able to use these troops aga
similar circumstances. The Governor reassured the Secretary of State in B:
"I intend formally to draw the serious attention of Ministers to the
lessons of last week. lam sure they realise, as you do, that Imperial Tr<
are not retained in South Africa to do the work which since June 30th they
had to perform" (169).
(• As soon as the 1913 strike was formally over the Minister of Defence sent :
structions to the Commandant General of the Active Citizen Force ordering 1
prepare a scheme for mobilising DRA commandos "so that say 5 000, 10 000,
armed and mounted men could be assembled and marched on the scene of disoi
on the Witwatersrand and especially Pretoria" (190). The Commandant was re
that "though endeavors would be made to move commandos by rail the assumpti
be that the railways would not be available and that all movements of comma
would have to be by road" (171).
The Government wanted to ensure that not only would armed forces be efficie
called up but also that they would be efficiently co-ordinated and deployed
the end of July 1913 a scheme had been devised whereby the Union would be d
into twelve Control areas. In the event of another strike each area would
under the control of SADF officer who would be responsible for co-ordinatin
the government forces in the area, for controlling the movements of civilia
in the area and for censoring newspapers and post (172). Instructions were
to the control officers that "every step which it is possible to arrange pr
to calling out the forces should now be taken by DSO's in as unobstrusive a
as possible" (173). A draft proclamation calling on all citizens to help tl
Q forces of the Crown to maintain law and order was dra*». up and instructions
sent to magistrates on procedure for the enrolment of Special Constables (1".
167 'Justice1 192 3/35/14
168 'Justice' 178 3/1468/13 SAP .reports on labour meetings
169 Correspondence relating to the disturbances on the Rand
170 DC 39 file 765, Under Secretary Defence to Commandant General ACF
171 ibid
172 DC 39 file 765. Mayor Collyer DS0. General Staff to Commandant Genera
24.7.13
173 ibid
174 G.N.L.B. I l l 1643/13 Minister of Defence t o Magistrates 24.7.13
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Following discussions with the Minister of Mines the Secretary for Mines suggested
a scheme for the rapid recruitment of Special Constables, In the event of a
crisis he suggested that the commissioner SAP could communicate with 5-6 well
known residents who would be able to call on about 500 other experienced
"gentlemen" who could do police duties while the police were occupied with strike
duties. He pointed out that the chief, merits of the scheme were that it could be
achieved silently, quickly and effectively (175). The idea was very similar to
J.P. Fitzpatrick's 'defence force1 of 600 formed on the fourth of July out of a
meeting of "leading citizens" (176).
One of the chief fears of the government was the effect another strike and rioting
might have on the black workers. The fears about the effect of strikers on black
workers were well grounded considering their strike in 1913. As the Inspector
of Mines said: "what they learned in a week last July might in the ordinary way
have taken them fifteen years to learn" (177). Accordingly plans were drawn up
for the removal of black workers from the corrupting scenes of a white strike to
their rural homes. The Native Recruiting Corporation and the Witwatersrand Native
Labour Association, who were responsible for recruiting most black mineworkers,
co-operated in the scheme (178).
Also in response to the reaction of blacks to the strike the Government appointed
. the Native Grievances Commission. The reasons for doing so are explicitly ex-
^ .pressed in a emeorandum on the strike drawn up by the Native Affairs Department:-
"Certain leading delegates to the South African Native Congress had been
present in Johannesburg and on the Reef during the disturbances. The
disabilities under which natives were working formed one of the subjects
discussed at the meeting of the Congress. Simultaneously with these
gatherings the demands of the white miners were being formulated for sub-
mission to the government by the Federation of Traders. Having reason to
believe that this lead would be followed by certain native agitators and
realising how lamentable it would be were the government to be placed in
the position of having to make concessions to natives as a result of de-
mands being formulated in respect of known grievances the Director re-
commended that such a move be anticipated and that a commission be appointed"
(180).
7.1 Economic Commission 1914
C
Similarly in an attempt to allay unrest the Government appointed a commission to
investigate the position of white workers. The Economic Commission (UG 12'14)
.reported on the seventeenth of January 1914. It generally opposed Government
A
-* interference in industry. It recommended a factory acT.'to regulate conditions of
labour in factories, and it recommended legislation providing for one day off a
week for industrial workers. It opposed the colour bar, the setting of minimum
175 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines to Minister Mines
176 Commission. Evidence of J.P. Fitzpatrick
177 UG12'14 para 95
178 GNLB 114
179 NA 5 mm 1870/13/F2 Secretary Native Affairs to Secretary Justice 6.12.13
180 NA 208 210/14/F473
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wages and the contract system on the mines. The Commission recommended legislation
to encourage the development of voluntary conciliation boards on which employees
would be represented by trade union officials and which would be responsible for
negotiating wages and conditions. The legislation they envisaged would have gone
further than the 1909 Act so that it would have explicitly recognised the role of
trade unions in industry and would encourage the development of standing Conciliation
Boards, but it did not go so far as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 in
that it favoured recognition of trade unions but it did not propose legislation
which would encourage trade unions and thus it did not envisage the legislative
enactment of voluntary agreements and their possible extension to the rest of the
industry, both of these are provisions of the 1924 Act.
7.2 Government Reaction - Co-option
Following the strike, in the light of reports by government officials closely in
touch with the trade union movement, the government considered legislative measures
to ensure industrial peace.
In September 1913 the Secretary for Mines and Industries forwarded reports of
the Inspectors of Mines on the industrial crisis of 1913 in which they suggested
reasons for the dispute and ways of averting another in the future (182). The
Inspectors for Johannesburg, Boksburg and Pretoria were unanimous in their
f -.opinion that trade unions should be given legislative recognition. The Inspector
for Krugersdorp differed. He was worried about "the effect upon the native - the
true labourer of this land - when he hears of the government recognition of trade
unions ... Will he not also demand some of the fruits of such legislation" (183).
His report also claimed that legislative recognition of trade unions in Britain
had led to more strikes and "labour tyranny". In his notes on this report the
Government Mining Engineer pointed out that "recognition" implies "regulation" and
that the whole report basically represented the attitude of the mine owners.
The Inspector of White Labour had suggested that trade unions should be given
statutory recognition by inserting a clause in the Factory Bill of 1911 (184),
but opposition to such a move in 1911 was as strong as in 1913. The 1914 Eco-
nomic Commission reported that they had "met with many employers who seem
strangely averse to have any dealings with trade union officials" (185).
Amongst some sections of the mining industry oppositions to trade unionism per-
sisted even after several years of formal recognition which began in 1915 (186).
In the aftermath of the 1913 strike the reasons for recognising trade unions
became more urgent. As already pointed out the government was becoming con-
(,-" cerned at the ascendancy of the "extremist"elements i%»the labour movement and
the permeation of these views into the rank and file. The Government Mining
Engineer in a letter to the Minister of Mines pointed out that labour legislation
must recognise this position and :-
"as you have already stated:, it must be our objectto attempt to drive a
wedge between the bona fide workman and the class of persons holding these
views" (187)
182 MNW 234 mm 1074/14
183 ibid Inspector of Mines Krugersdorp to Government Mining Engineer 9.9.13
184 MNW 51 Inspector White Labour to Secretary Mines 30.5.11
185 UG 12'14 p. 88
186 MNW 395 mm 2762/17 Secretary Mines and Industries to IWL. 1,11.17
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The Economic Commission of 1914 was explicit about how the recognition of t
unions could help to achieve this:-
"Trade Onion organisation is impossible without officials, and offici
being of influence in their trade unions are the natural persons to
bring into negotiations with employers. Moreover, the official is ir
likely to take the business point of view, and examine the situation
calmly, than the workman who has some personal grievance rankling ir
mind. Finally, it's certain that, recognised or not, labour organis
will continue among white men. All experience proves it, our experi
proves also that organisation in the open, made sober by recognition
a very different thing from organisation which has to fight against
tempt or antagonism, and may be compelled to keep its organisation s
It is the latter form of organisation which is so pecularly liable t
foster extreme and even revolutionary doctrines"(188).
The advanced views of the Economic Commission of 1914 are apparent in its n
mendation of the recognition of the Federation of Trades. As they pointed t
even the most liberal employers were wary of the Federation. The Coramissioi
that such fears were unfounded and the Federation if recognised would act a;
second line of defence against industrial war" (190)
Towards the end of 1913 a bill "to provide for the registration and regulat:
trade unions "was introduced (191). This provided for the official registry
of trade unions. Trade unions must supply to the registrar the name of the
the names of officers, address, details of funds and what they are used for
Under clause 7 (1) any branch of a trade union could apply for registration
separate union. This clause would tend to lead to a strengthening of local
autonomy in trade unions and prevent the development of powerful centralized
organisations and makes it less likely that a strong officialdom would devel
and become entrenched. Clause 9 provided for the possibility of amalgamatio
two or more unions in the same trade or industry but stipulated that the con
at least two thirds of the whole membership of each trade union must be obta
The Act prescribed penalties for any attempt to intimidate people to join un
and made trade union officials liable for any illegal acts of the union.
This bill must be seen in the context of the other labour legislation introd
in the wake of the 1913 strike, particularly the proposed Industrial Prevent
Bill. This bill would have superceded the 1909 Industrial Dispute Act, whic
applied to the Transvaal. Of this act the Inspector of White Labour had sai'
"generally speaking, this Act, for all intents and purposes, has been .
dead letter on our statutes" (193).
188 UG 12f14 p. 88
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The Bill was intended to be more far reaching and strict in its provisions than
the 1909 Act (194). The intention was to stop sympathy strides and make general
strikes impossible (195). To achieve this some interesting provisions were in-
cluded in the act. Section 7 aimed to restrict strikes by isolating them and
removing the principle cause of rioting. To achieve this it forbad picketting
and made it illegal for employers to introduce strike breakers. The bill pro-
hibited a strike until one month after a Disputes Board had reported on the dis-
pute and it was to be compulsory to ballot all employees and obtain a majority
before a strike could be called. A new clause was later inserted under which at
any time during the course of a strike on the application of five employees the
registrar of trade unions could call for a ballot the results of which would be
published in the Government Gazette and national newspapers and sent to the em-
ployers and trade unions. Under Section 43 it was illegal for light, power, water
or sanitary employees to strike and illegal for.anyone to strike if this might
endanger life on expose valuable property to injury (e.g. in the case of a mine
strike it would be illegal to prevent pumping services). The penalty for in-
fringement of these provisions was a maximum of two years hard labour. If a
trade union transgressed the Act all officials' were liable.
The most novel clauses compared with the 1909 Act, were those providing for the
establishment of standing conciliation boards in any industry. The boards were
to consist of equal number of employer and employee representatives. The bill
implicitly recognised trade unions by allowing for the representation of employees
1
 by trade union officials of a registered trade union or by a representative
elected by a ballot of all employees (196).
In September 1913 the parliamentary draughtsmen were urged to hurry with the bill
because the Minister considered it urgent and wanted it in a form to put before
Cabinet (197). On the 26th of January the Chamber of Mines wrote to the Secretary
for Mines and Industries:-
"the recent general strike offers additional reasons necessitating the
passing of Acts dealing with these questions and I am therefore directed
to urge that this legislation be proceeded with in the coming session".
The letter went on to urge an amendment to the trade union bill making it com-
pulsory to register (198). The Transvaal Coal Owners Society wrote to the Sec-
retary for Mines and Industries supporting the bill and demanding heavy penalties
for strikes, intimidation and violence, inciting to strike and "go-slows" (199).
Organisations of labour were not so enthusiastic. Protest meetings in May 1914
of the labour Party and the trade unions passed resolutions condemning the In-
. dustrial disputes Bill and the Riotors Assemblies Bill (discussed below) (200).
However, the Industrial Disputes Bill and Trade Onion Bill were not passed. They
had been merged into one bill the Industrial Dispute and Trade Union bill and
passed through two readings in the House of Assembly and were then referred to
select committee. The Bill was revised in select committee and referred to a
committee of the whole House for amendment. It re-emerged as the Industrial
Disputes and Labour Bureaux Bill with clauses on the registration of trade unions
removed (201). The Bill however failed to get through Senate before the end of
the session and was not reintroduced in the next session.
194 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines and Industries to Secretary Justice
12.12.13
195 MNW 217 mm 4256/13 Secretary Mines and Industries to Secretary Justice 19.9.13
and 22.9.13
196 This clause was disliked by some employers. The Johannesburg Chamber of
Commerce for example wrote to the Secretary for Mines and Industries on the
second of May 1914 demanding that representatives should always be chosen by
full ballot of employees.
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till J I clauses xn the trade unions and industrail disputes bill dealina
with strxkes and preventing picketting the Government also considered more genera1
measures to prevent a reoccurance of the rioting of July 1913. In their demand I
lllT^T T% ^ V913 Str±ke thS t d l i L ^^included a dLand for the ^
I K me6ting Of the 4th ° f Julv haa >*en P™-
P u b l f ^etings and Disturbances Bill drafted at the end of 1913 would
/ ° f 1 8 9 4 b U t W ° U l d l t S e l f h a v e m ° r e effectively enforced its
Sfted a f / ^ r ^ r aPPliCable to the ->»le ""i°n (202). The Bill was re!
drafted after the strike of January 1914. It was passed in July 1914 as the Rioton,
Assemblies Act. Under this Act any Magistrate acting under authority of the
peace is in « ™ T ^ t O P r ° h l b i t ^ gathering, if he t h i n k s ^ public
III LI dang"' "nd Ca" Prevent access to suc" * P^ce. The act governs the
act t L n " y ^ a t S a U t h o r i t i e s gainst illegal gatherings. Chapter 2 of the
the fan* \ P T l b l t S Pickettlng- L a b ° " party efforts to have an amendment to
1906 ani'n ^ " " " f O l l ° W t h e e X a m p l e o f t h e B " t i s « Tr^de Dispute Act of
oi.L . 9 a Peaceful picketting, were unsuccessful. The Bill also included
clauses to prevent the intimidation of people in order to get them to join a
f ™ 1 M - T h \ b i 1 1 •!•» Prided for the liability of all trade union officials
" * "T ^ ^ ^ " p r o h i b i ted the breaking of contracts by
^
 emplo
*
ees
- " »
 A c t a
^ ° Provided for the deportation of »un-
o a P P e a l S b y m e m b e r S f r o m a 1 1 actions of the House the Act
*
 P S a C e
 P r e s e r v a t i o n Ordinance of 1902 which conforced
„ ^ P°»ers of arrest and detention for three weeks without access to the
courts of people suspected for treason or sedition. The leaders arested in
T r n ^ r ^ ^ " ^ U n d e r t h ± S o r d i " a " « . The Act also provided that, if
T y- T determines that it is necessary, offenders may be tried by
Criminal Court, not by jury. (203).
for thTwh9*7 S U " e S S f u l s t r i k e o f 1 9 1 3 « « not lead to many legislative gains
fo ^ K workers. Their demand for the repeal of the 1894 Act was acceeded
to only because and far more repressive measure was passed in its place. Some
™ < r « r femands l e d t o discussion between the Mines Department and trade
union officials but few of them were passed.
A private members' bill, backed by the labour party, which envisaged the setting
up of wage boards for each industry equally representative of employers and em-
ployees in the industry which could determine a minimum wage for each industry
was introduced in February 1914. Haggar of the Labour Party had in fact asked •
the government to consider the formation of wage boards before the strike in May
II K ? ^ been agreed to- flfter discussion in the house in February 1914the bill was withdrawn.
One of the workers' demands in 1913 had been for.a Factory Act. A Factory Bill
was introduced in 1913. Soon after Union the government had considered introducing
legislation controlling factories. In 1911 the Inspector of White Labour drafted
a tactory act and commented that ttie passing of such a measure and the setting up
of wage boards would help solve the problem of industrial disputes (205). The
Il PM 1699/18 Under Secretary for Mines and Industries to CIWL 2.4.18
203 PM 1/1/H9 Notes on Riotous Assemblies Act by Law Adviser
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1913 Factory Bill drew considerable criticism from employers. At first the act
proposed a basic SO hour week for all adult males (though many exceptions were
made e.g..for seasonal work, continuous process industry etc). After protests this
was altered to a 54 hour week (206). The bill not only proposed restricted hours
it also stipulated work conditions, provided for the registration of factories,
numbers of employees and work done in the factories. The act contained provisions
attempting to prevent evasion by the worst sweating employers the "putters-out"
to home workers (207) . In drawing up the legislation the mines department made
full use of studies of similar legislation in other countries and discovered
that rather than having an adverse affect industry had flourished under such
legislation (208). However, this bill also failed to pass.
Immediately after the 1914 strike a very harsh bill somewhat euphemistically
called 'The Workroens' Protection Act' was introduced (209). This made it an offence
to interfere with any person to induce them to strike. This was intended to
prevent 'pulling-out'. It would be an offence to "interfere" with anybody in an
attempt to induce them to join a trade union. It made it an offence to enter
premises and interview workers about their conditions or terms of employment.
"Interference" had a wide definition and included the use of "opprobious epithets"
i.e. like the word scab. Breach of contract was to be a criminal offence for
essential service workers or where it was liable to lead to loss of life or damage
to machinery. The bill made it illegal for trade unions to punish a member who con-
{;-, tinued working during a strike by fines, removal of privileges or explusion. The
bill, if enforced, would have made it extremely difficult for trade unions to
maintain and control their membership and would have made expansion almost im-
possible. The bill was not passed but various clauses were merged into the Riotous
Assemblies Act.
Two measures which had been demanded were passed. The Workmen's Compensation Act
provided compensation for accidents at work whether or not the employer was
personally negligent. The Act applied to all workers except black mineworkers. It
did not provide compensation for industrial disease (210). The Act consolidated
the various acts of the provinces. It was passed in July 1914. The other act
was the Workmen's Wages Protection Act, passed in June 1914. In terms of this act
workmen could apply to the principal (i.e. the person on whose behalf work has
been done) as soon as his wages fall due. The intention of the Act was to cover
• those cases, numerous is the building industry for example, where the contractor
did not have sufficient money to coyer the workers' wages or disappeared without
paying them.
By the end of 1914 the government had still not evolved a long term strategy for
(.'".* dealing with white workers. The measures which had h^en introduced to regulate
the position of trade unions had not been passed. The only legislation which
dealt with the relations between employers and white workers the 1907 Act, although
criticised as a "dead letter" remained. The Industrial Disputes and Trade Union
Bills were not reintroduced. Posgibly this was partly due tocontinuing opposition
to the recognition of trade unions among some sections of mining capital (211).
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Perhaps also the measures no longer seemed so urgent after the defeat of the ex-
tremists in January 1914 and the blows to trade unionism inflicted then. As the
Secretary for Mines and Industries ideologically expressed it immediately after
the Government victory in 1914; "it is very desirable that the Government should
not depart from its industrial programme of legislation, as many people would, I
think, like it to do now that it has won a victory over the extremists. It seems
to me more important than ever that the government should adhere steadily to the
programme which it has set before itself in the country. In order to avoid the
accusation of being vindictive" (212). However, it was apparently no longer
necessary to "adhere" to its programme and the Government continued in its former,
established programme of tolerating trade unions but granting them no special
position in industry and society. Both government and employers no doubt felt
safer now that the Riotous Assemblies Act was on the statutes and they had means
to control trade union activities because officials were now liable for transgressions
by trade union members of the Act (213). As far as.the white workers were con-
cerned the attempts to obtain a 48 hour week minimum wage, paid holidays, pro-
hibition on Sunday Work and an apprenticeship system by legislative means had failed.
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Abbreviations used
ASE Amalgamated Society of Engineer
(Later called AEU - Amalgamated Engineering Union)
ASRHS Amalgamated Society of Railway and Harbour Servants
DC Archive of the Secretary of Defence
Disturbances Commission Report and Evidence of the Witwatersrand Disturbances
Commission C7112
DRA District Rifle Association
Federation Transvaal Federation of Trades
I.W.L. Inspector of White Labour
•Justice1 Records of the Department of Justice
MNW Records of the Department of Mines and Industries
NA Records of the Native Affairs Department
PM Records of the Prime Minister
R.D.M. Rand Daily Mail
SAMR Records of the South African Mounted Riflemen
SAP South African Police
SAR South African Railways
TCM Transvaal Chamber of Mines
TMA Transvaal Miners Association
8. Further Unrest after the 1913 Strike
( • " •
In December 1913 there was a strike of engine drivers on the coal mines of Natal.
After negotiations they agreed to return to work. Some increase in pay had been
granted but the demand for decreased hours was not conceded (214) . Later in
December the Natal branch of the TMA struck work with the authorization of the
Johannesburg executive after management had refused to reinstate four TMA officials
who had been dismissed. The strike continued until after the railway strike of
January 1914. After a dead-lock had been reached in negotiations the TMA sent an
official, McKerrall, down from the Rand on 1 January 1914 to help resolve the
dispute. According to the Inspector of White Labour, McKerrall was extremely
belligerent and uncompromising. McKerrall claimed to be in contact with Poutsma,
the General Secretary of the railway workers' union ASRHS, and said that if the
owners did not accept the TMA ultimatum, which included immediate reinstatement
of the TMA men, then the railwaymen and the white workers of the Witbank colliery
would strike in sympathy (215). There is evidence of government fears of this
strike spreading to the gold mines on the Rand. (216) .
In October 1913 thousands of Indians, led by Gandhi, took part in a passive resistence
campaign against the E3 tax imposed on them.
The campaign took the form of courting arrest, by means of illegal marches for example
A mass march took place from Natal into the Transvaal, from which Indians were
prohibited. By the end of October the action had spread to the coal mines (217)
and by 28 October over 3000 Indians were on strike (218) . As usual employers and
government officials refused to believe that the Indians had any good reason or
any serious desire to strike. They did so only because of "intimidation" by
agitators. (219) In an ingenious move the authorities arrested "ring leaders"
and sentenced them to hard labour
 an{a had t n e mine compounds proclaimed to be
jails and so forced the Indian labour force back to work under police supervision (220)
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By the end of November Indians in the factories of Durban and Pie termar it zburg
and on sugar estates had joined the strike (221). By the beginning of December
large numbers of strikers had returned to work. Even so, there were then over
17 000 workers still out (222). According to the chief magistrate of Durban,
the use of armed force to suppress the strike (it was also alleged that
prisoners in jail were flogged) was not to intimidate the workers and break
the strike but, 'predictably1,to prevent "agitators" intimidating them into
striking. He is very candid on the reasons for the many,arrests. These were
"necessary to show to the natives that there existed at hand the necessary
force to handle any number of strikers " (223).
The strikes gradually petered out. and, resorting to already familiar tactics,
the government appointed the Indian Enquiry Commission on 11 December 1913.
9. The 1914 Railwaymen's Strike.
In October 1913 when the threat of 'industrial action* on the Rand had receded
somewhat the Minister of Railways, Burton, issued circulars on the necessity
to retrench labour in the railway workshops (224). On 24 December the railway
administration announced that in the interests of economy it would be necessary
to retrench even more labour (225). Eventually 673 workers were retrenched.
9.1. ;Another Commission of Enquiry
At the time that these retrenchments were announced the Railway Commission of
Enquiry into railwaymen's grievances was in session. This had been appointed
under the agreement of 4 July in terms of Section 21 of the Railway Act of 1912.
The Commission was enquiring into (a) Introduction of an 8 hour day (b) A
minimum wage for white adult employees of 8s per day (c) Revision of local
allowances (d) Abolition of piecework (e) Better payment for salaried staff (f)
Extra payment for overtime (g) Severity of punishment (h) Decentralisation of
shop management. The chairman was C.G. Ward, appointed by the government.
There were to be two other members, one appointed by the administration, the other
by a ballot of all railway employees (226). The ASRHS, after deliberating on
whether or not they should ignore the commission, decided to recommend the rail-
way workers to vote for H.J. Poutsma the General Secretary as their representative
(227). He was elected in October 1913 (228).
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The government had feared a railwaynien's strike after the 1913 strike but none
• took place. The commission became the focus of the railwaymen's interest and
hopes. When retrenchments were announced talk of a strike to halt retrenchments
and obtain redress for long standing grievances spread.
g.2 Background to the Railway Strike
Several commissions had examined the grievances of the railwaymen. p.epeatedly
their recommendations had been ignored. In 1910 the Commission noted that the
recommendations of the 1907 Commission not been implemented (229).
The 1910 Commission noted the extreme antipathy of the General Manager of the
Central SAR, William Hoy, later General Manager of the SAR, to trade unions or
any form of consultation with the men; they quoted from among statements made
by him;
"If you try to meet them the whole lot will combine against you".
"The moment I meet them they are not satisfied until they have got my
hands and my feet and my whole body". (230)
Bearing in mind this attitude the proviso at the beginning of the Commission's
report is not surprising:
, • "At the very outset your Commissioners wish to place on record the great
fear of the whole staff who gave evidence that their evidence would in-
evitably cause them to be victimised". (231)
In this connection the Commissioner reported on two "coincidences" (232) which
occurred when he was taking evidence at Volksrust and Waterval-boven, Members
of the railway CID visited both places at the same time he did.
Despite the recommendation of the 1912 Commission on Railway Grievances (233)
that the administration should allow railway workers to be represented by the
ASRHS if that was what the workers wanted it was not until after the 1913 strike
that the administration even considered recognizing trade unions.
One of the most oft repeated complaints to all the commissions was the severity
of punishment meted out for offences. The 1910 Commissioner recommended that
an appeal board by instituted (234). The 1912. Commissioner considered that the
proceedure laid down by the 1912 Railway Act whereby appeal could be made to the
General Manager and then, if no solution was forthcoming, to the Railway Board,
was sufficient. (235) The ASRHS wanted an Appeal Board instituted with equal
;. representation of employees. (236). After the 1913 Strike the railway workers
put forward this demand again and an Appeal Board was instituted which was
eventually given legal recognition in the Railway and Harbours Strike Service
Amendment Act of 1914. (237). Even so the complaint about the severity of
punishment still remained. Under the 1912 Act employees who "deserted", were
disobedient, negligent etc. were liable to dismissal with loss of all superannuation
contributions. (238). When the 1912 Act was being debated in the House this
clause had been called "downright robbery" (239). The 1912 Commission recommended
226 Government Gazette 15.8.13
227 'Justice1 193 3/18/14 Annual Conference ASRHS August 1913
228 Government Gazette 11.10.13
229 Report of Commission of inquiry into complaints of CSAR Staff 190 p. 103
230 ibid. p. 110
231 ibid. p. 2
232 ibid. p. 3
233 UG 64'12 p. 135
234 1910 Commission p. 56
235 UG 64'12 p. 130
236 'South African Railway and Harbour Servants Review 1/3/12
237 PM 1/1/19 Notes of Law Adviser on SAR Strike Amendment Act
238 UG 64'12
239 'Natal Mercury' 3.2.12
- 4 -
that a worker should only be liable to forfeit contributions for fraud or dishonesty
(240).
Employee representatives to all the commissions asked for the establishment of
an 8 hour day. The commissions generally reported that for a service such as the
railway service it would be impossible to have an 8 hour day for all workers. They
all agreed that the hours at work of employees should be reduced "as much as possible"
The 1910 Commission mentioned people working up to 18 hours at a stretch (241).
The 1914 Commission calculated the average number of hours of running staff for
a month they obtained figures of 302.4 (Cape Town) 284.6 (Kimberley) 307.3
(Port Elizabeth) 304.3 (East London) 304.1 (Bloemfontein) 307.1 (Durban) 306.3
(Johannesburg) 293.3 (Pretoria). This gives an average of about 73 hour per
week. (245). The ASRHS argued that the introduction of the 8 hour day would
mean the employment of unemployed people and greater efficiency which would mean
that it would not result in increased costs (246) . The 1914 Commission recommended
that wherever possible the hours of work should be reduced to 8 per day and that
the Administration should investigate ways of reducing hours. (247) The Adminis-
tration had already introduced a 48 hour week for artizans. (248).
In accordance with their demand for reduced hours the ASRHS asked for enhanced
rates for overtime (249). The 1910 Commission found that workers were actually
paid a lower rate for overtime. Their pay was calculated on the basis of a
substantive rate plus a daily district allowance according to the area they lived
in. Overtime was paid on the substantive rate (250). The 1912 Commission re-
commended the payment of time and a quarter for weekday overtime and time and a
half for Sunday overtime based on the substantive rate of pay (251). In their
minority report the employees representatives recommended the same rates but
based on the consolidated pay (252). On the 1st of January 1913 overtime rates
were introduced, for artisans only, based on the substantive pay rates (253) .
In their evidence to the commission the trade unions were unanimous in their
demand for the abolition of 'piecework' in the workshops. The system existing was
not, strictly speaking, piecework. It was a bonus time system. A time was
calculated for every piece of work. The worker was paid a bonus if he completed
a piece in less time. Trade unions claimed that this system led to numerous
unsatisfactory results. They said that the rates tended to be based on the rate
of the youngest most efficient men, which acted against the interests of older
workers. They said that the system led to sweating, shoddy work, to competition
between the men and a tendency to drive the rates down and prevented the proper
training of apprentices because men did not have time to attend to them. (254).
The 1910 Commission agreed with the trade unions and recommended the abolition
of 'piecework*. (255). The 1912 Commission said that,-*although the opinion of
the men at every centre they visited was unanimously against 'piecework', they
thought that insufficient evidence had been given of alleged abuses and decided
not to recommend its abolition. They did recommend various safeguards to
prevent competition leading to rate, cutting and bad work. (256). The 1914
Commission also reported against the abolition of piecework and made recommendations
to safeguard the men from rate cutting (257).
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•The ASRHS wanted the whole basis of organisation of the staff in the railway
service altered. They wanted the regulation of pay, conditions and discipline
to be governed by Parliament. Under the 1912 Act the General Manager was given
the right to make regulations governing pay, conditions etc. They also wanted
clauses in the Act, which empowered the Administration to discipline workers for
offences even after they had been found innocent by a criminal court, to be
deleted (258),
The 1912 Commission considered grievances of individuals and groups. It made
hundreds of recommendations on anomalies of pay, hours, conditions, pensions etc.
in the different services in the provinces before Union The 1912 Railway Act
was supposed to iron out the differences. One of the demands of the railway workers
after the 1913 strike was for the implementation of the recommendations made by
the 1912 Commission (259). Changes made, by the 1912 Act and the continuance of
anomalies was one of the sources of grievance felt by the railway workers in 1914.
As government employees the railway workers were not immune to the fluctuations
of the capitalist economy. For a start the South Africa Act explicitly stated
that the railways must be run on "business principles". Even without this
Stricture the railway administration could hardly have run the railways in such a
way as to impede the profitability of private industry in the country, especially
not the revenue producing gold mining industry. As the Commission in 1910 pointed
.-.out, all the grievances of the worker arose from the aim of the Administration
to run the railways at the lowest possible cost (260) .
Even so, as Government employees, whose terras of employment were governed by Act
of Parliament the railway workers faced peculiar difficulties in organizing. The
1912 Railway Act (which consolidated the Acts governing railway workers in the
various provinces) provided for pension and sickness funds. For employees taken
m to the permanent staff the act supposedly gave security of tenure- except for
negligence, transgression of regulations etc. One of the focal points of
organisation of working class people has been to provide those social needs which
the capitalist system has denied them. Trade unions often began as benefit
societies and this remained a major part of their function. For railway workers
the problems of providing for sickness, unemployment and old age were catered
for by act of parliament. The 1912 Act gave the Administration power to make
regulations on the wages and conditions of employment of railwaymen. The organ-
isation of railwaymen therefore directly focussed on the question of conditions of
employment.
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It is difficult to determine why the 1914 strike occured precisely when it did.
Up to the end of 1913 there was no official correspondence amongst the unions
about a strike nor were any preparations made (272). As late as the 29th of
December the General Secretary of the ASRHS, Poutsma, was preparing for a
resumption of the tour of the Grievances Commission of which he was a member.
The strike began on the eight of January. Not until the 5th of January were the
secretaries at the centres who had been notified of the impending visit of the
Commission notified of the concellation by the chairman (273). The Federation
were not notified of the likelihood of a strike until the sixth of January (274).
On that date the ASRHS held a mass meeting in Pretoria Town Hall at which they
resolved that "having heard the Governments motives for the retrenchment now
taking place" they would strike from the eighth (275). On the seventh Poutsma
addressed a mass meeting of about 400 railwaymen at Braamfontein who unanimously
decided to strike (276). On the same day Poutsma addressed a meeting in Market
Square Pretoria at which about 1 000 people were present (277). At this meeting
Kendall the organizing secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE)
promised full support if the ASRHS struck solidly. He also said that the ASE
would want to put forward their own demands including one for the abolition of
piecework. In support of the railwaymen the building workers of Pretoria at a
meeting on the eleventh of January attended by about 1 000 people decided to
strike. The Typographical Union and the Bakers Union followed suit (278).
The TMA announced on the thirteenth that their ballot had resulted in a
... majority in favour of striking (279). The railwaymen at Pretoria formed a strike
committee and notified other centres that they must come out on strike.
The ASRHS executive had not made the most basic preparations for a strike. They
had made no attempt to discover the attitude of the non-union mean and to see' if they
would support a strike. The ASRHS membership was estimated at 15 000 out of a
total of over 30 000 white workers on the railways (280). No attempt had been
made to ballot trade unionists at the various centres. The secretary of the
ASRHS at East London was horrified on receiving notification to strike. He said
they had no idea of an intention to strike,and consequently, had made no preparation^
they had no strike committee, no funds, no organisation. He said that the men at
his centre were very bitter about not being consulted. They decided not to strike
but to wait for a proper ballot of the membership and he concluded his letter to
the Pretoria Strike Committee "disgusted we are and I think disgusted we will
remain" (281). The General Secretary replied in very mild tones with little
attempt to persuade the centre to come out and little sense of urgency about the
situation (282). One can assume that a similar reaction of disgust was felt at
other centres at the autocratic methods of the Executive. According to the Magis-
trate at Volksrust the men there also refused to strike and were very indignant
£ at being ordered out without consultation and against the wish of the majority.
In fact they all struck work on the ninth of January (283).
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After consulting Poutsma,the TMA executive, the South African Council of the ASE
and the Federation Executive held a General Committee meeting on the eleventh
(284). They discussed what support should be given to the railway workers. The
TMA representatives opposed a general strike on the grounds that they had not
got the finances to support the workers. (285). The Executive of the Federation
was also split. Some of them favoured caution after a report from Mason on the
organisation of the railwaymen in which he said that he thinks "Poutsma mis-
calculated things" (286). However, others, including Walmsley, Bain, Crawford
and Kendall favoured immediate practical support. The Federation Executive de-
cided on the eighth that the decision on a general strike must be left to the
General Committee meeting of the eleventh, but, even so, they formed a strike
committee straight away. The G.C. meeting on the eleventh decided to hold a
ballot of members to decide on whether to call a sympathy strike. The G.C.
recommended the members to vote for a strike. The number participating in the
ballots were small only a few thousand. The ASE, the Amalgamated Society
of Carperters and Joiners and the Masons Society ballot resulted in a large propor-
tion in favour of a strike. The Federation called a general strike from the
fourteenth of January. The'Pretoria Strike Committee had asked for moral and
financial support and they condemned the Federation in calling a general strike
and said this would not help them and was only likely to defeat their ends (287).
When the Federation passed its motion in favour of a general strike as far as they
were concerned control of the strike has passed to them. On the ninth of
January Poutsma and other leaders were arrested. The Federation passed a res-
olution saying it would not consider negotiation with the government until these
men were released (288). Several days later the Pretoria Strike Committee and
the Federation were still bickering about who would participate in negotiation
with the government. The Pretoria Strike Committee said they deplored the general
strike and wanted the final say in all decisions. The Federation countered by
saying they called the general strike after Poutsma had asked for support (289).
However, the government had made its preparation and had no intention of nego-
tiating (290).
One may ask how did the leaders manage to misinterpret the situation so completely.
Why did the Federation leaders presume that they could call on workers to support
the strike? Why did Poutsma and the Executive Committee of the ASRHS think that
a strike would be supported with so little preparation? Part of the problem in
assessing this is the problem of understanding what the feelings and reactions
of the white workers actually were.
Under Martial Law, imposed on the fourteenth of January, the press was strictly
censored. When the Transvaal Chronicle transgressed the limits they were
threatened with closure. (291). The Editor had written about the daily
suppression of truth about the strike in the press, the arrest of peaceful
citizens and called the official reports of the railway administration on the
strike "deliberate untruths" (292). Several years after the strike, in 1917,
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* when the Pretoria building worker went on strike the trade union officials refused
to give any interviews to the press because of the false information printed in the
press in 1914 and, in particualr, the report that the Durban workers had resumed
work a week before they had (293). It makes it more difficult to trace the
reactions in different centres when the press is clearly even more unreliable
than usual.
I think one can say that the trade union leaders acted the way they did anticipating
another lands lide strike as in 1913. As Didsbury, one of the members of the
Executive of the Federation said^on the ninth of January the leaders of the Fed-
eration must make a decision otherwise the rank and file would take action first.
(294). The trade union leader actions were partly due to pressure from some
sections of the rank and file. Partly they were also due to incompetence and
arrogance. The most striking failure of the trade union leaders was in their utter
miscalculation of the attitude and actions of the Government.
9.3 The 1914 Strike and The South African Defence Force
Since July 1913 the Government had been preparing for another confrontation with
the white working class and the trade unions. On the sixth of January while
the Federation was deliberating on what action to take in support of the rail-
wayraen the Minister of Defence, Smuta,contacted the magistrates and controlling
( '.officers to be prepared for the enforcement of the Martial Law control system (295).
On the seventh Government troops occupied the station and railway workshops in
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Germiston. After the ASRHS call for a general strike
from the eighth the government called out the commandos.On the thirteenth of
January the Minister of Defence informed the controlling officer for Johannesburg
that the Martial Law proclamation would be signed at midnight if the Federation
decided on a general strike and that the Government Gazette proclamation had already
been signed bearing that date. (296).
In 1913 the Government had been caught by surprise by the sudden spread of the
strike. The only local forces available were either strikers or sympathetic to the
strikers (297). Apart from this problem the defence forces were in the midst of
rearrangement in terms of the 1912 Defence Act. The government was forced to
call on imperial troops. But, as previously stated the imperial Government
warned them that these troops were not stationed in South Africa for this purpose.
Formation of A South African Defence Force
The union Government had been organizing their own defence force for some years.
In the London Colonial Conference of 1907 emphasis had been laid on the importance
of military co-operation between Britain and the colonies in order to lighten
the British weapon-load (298). The size of the British garrison had been sys-
tematically reduced and by 1909 there were only 10 000 troops stationed in
South Africa (299). Volunteer organisations which underwent yearly military
training were built up. When one considers that the Anglo-Boer war had only
finished in 1902 it is clear that the development of a Union Defence Force was
a fraught political issue. The governing party after Union the South African
party, was an amalgamation of the Afrikaner parties of the provinces. There
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• were tensions within the party on the question of the imperial connection. This
was clearly demonstrated by the Nationalist secession in 1913 and the rebellion of
prominent Defence Force generals in 1914. Smuts and the Imperial faction were
loyal to the Empire and were anxious that there should be no question of the
defence force being built up as a force for rebellion against the Empire. As
the commander of the Imperial Forces in South Africa put it;
"Politics would have no place in the South African army, and Mr Smuts
knows perfectly well the curse this has been in the other Colonial forces".
(300).
As Smuts himself said:-
"We want an organisation that shall not be Boer or British, but a South
African army ... Do your duty in a broad national spirit". (301).
The Defence Act was passed on the 14th of June 1912. (302). The period from
then until the 1st of July 1913 was for the demobilisation of the old volunteers
and the organisation of the new permanent force, the South" African Mounted Riflemen^
and the Active Citizen Force (ACF). All white males between the ages of 17 and
21 were compulsorily registered and liable to be called up for the ACF which in-
volved initials period of training and camps and drilling at regular intervals (303)
The Act also provided for the formation of Defence Rifle Associations with which
/"volunteers could register, receive a rifle and be liable for call-up by
Government proclamation.
In terms of the Defence Act the Imperial troops were on loan to the Union
Government until 1914 when a decision would be taken on their withdrawal (304).
The Union and the Imperial Governments were aware of the likelihood of these
troops being withdrawn as the prospect of a European war loomed. It was im-
perative that the South African state was capable of defending itself. With
the threats of invasion from German S.W. Africa, white strikes and rioting and a
black rebellion it was also necessary that this capacity was demonstrated, which
was one effect of the governments actions in the 1914 strike.
The Imperial Government regarded the gold mining industry as a priority industry
in the war (305). Therefore they were concerned that there should be no
reoccurance of the strikes by black and white workers in 1913. By their actions
in 1914 (described in detail later) the Union Government indicated that they
also would not countenance any strike. Smuts and the Imperial faction saw their
political future to lie as much in Imperial support for their future as in;
popular support at home. They would have agreed with the sentiment expressed in
(. the 'Star':- ^ .
"South Africa stands or falls by the Empire as a whole, and the battle of
South Africa might be fought in the Mediteranean or in Belgium". (306)
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As the President, Steyn, expressed it:-
"Ministers venture to express the hope that the provisions of the bill will
indicate to His Majesty's Government their earnest desire to establish
in the Union a defence system suitable to the needs and resources of the
Union and one which can play an adequate part in the defence resources
of the Empire" (307).
The Union Government was still faced with the problem of promoting the enthusiasm
and loyalty of the Afrikaner population for military service in a defence force
which was an adjunct of the Imperialist Army. As the evidence to the 1914
Commission on the Rebellion indicates there was a lot of opposition amongst
Afrikaners to becoming 'British Soldiers'. The initiation of the defence force
instituted under the 1912 Act occurred in 1914. The first action of the burgher
forces was against the 'uitlander' urban workers with their alien ideologies.
The Government wanted to use the opportunity to engender enthusiasm amongst the
citizen forces for the task of defending the union and wanted to consolidate
these forces.-
On the fifteenth of January instructions were sent to all commanding officers:-
"You should arrange with the Senior Officers of the Permanent Force ....
to get in touch with the commandants of the commandos and ask them to
('• invite all members of their commandos to enrol as members of Defence
Rifle Associations".
Those who enrolled were allowed to keep the rifles issued to them as long as they
remained members of the DRA (308 ).
The reports of the control officers after the 1914 strike are mainly concerned,
not with the strike, but with details of mobilisation, food and supplies. The
control officer for the Eastern Transvaal area reported that:-
"Beyond the rapid mobilisation of Defence Force commandos ... no points
occur to me upon which a report can be furnished (309)
A control officer For the Cape District reported:-
"The succesful employment of the Defence Force on strike duty has not only
put their organisation to a practical test but has also demonstrated, to
the public in a forceable manner their real utility for war purposes and,
whatever the cost has been, it has been amply repaid by the general feeling
of security in the community thereby engendured" (310).
9; -The Martial Law Control System of 1914 ^ .
Martial Law came into effect on the fourteenth of January. The controlling officers
had previously drawn up plans, in consultation with local railway officials, for
the defence of the railway system and the docks. (311). The armed forces prevented
strikers from making any contact with those who continued working and were sufficient
to prevent subotage or violent demonstration by the strikers (312). On the
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fourteenth most railway lines and bridges were guarded by troops. As an example
of the scale of mobilisation; 1798 armed troops and police guarded the railway
workshop and docks in Cape Town, on the twelfth a commando of 300 was sent to
Germiston, 300 to Springs, on the fourteenth 190 armed men were sent to Waterval
Boven, 240 armed men guarded the railway station, bridge and power station at
Vereeniging, 50 armed men were sent to each mine in Witbank (313). Apart from
troops and police "reliable" citizens were enrolled as special constables and
armed to replace police called up for strike duty. The Government ensured that
the Forces mobilised were treated with respect. Every day of the strike arrests
were made and fines of £5 to £10 imposed for such offences as "swearing at"
"booing" or even "scowling" at burghers (314) .
Numerous strikers were arrested under the Preservation of Peace Ordinance of 1902
which permitted the authorities to arrest and hold incommunicado those suspected
of sedition. On the tenth Poutsma and Nield of the ASRHS and Waterston (secretary
of the Labour Party) were arrested (315) . On the fourteenth two members of the
TMA Executive were arrested in Natal. On the fifteenth "hundreds'Vere arrested in
Benoni (316). The whole of the Pretoria Strike Committee was arrested while they
were involved in discussing the strike with the Mayor of Pretoria (317). The
Johannesburg strike committee was arrested after the Government had refused another
offer of the Executive of the Federation to negotiate a settlement. Instead the
Trades Hall was surrounded and a field gun trained on it and the controlling
s- officer was instructed to arrest every man in the Trades Hall "using most drastic
measures to do so if, after warning, the persons in that building refuse to give
themselves up without violence" (317). On the sixteenth several strikers at
Breyton Collieries were arrested and also two leaders of the Labour Party, Kent-
ridge and Boydell. On the seventeenth 56 strike leaders in Volksrust and the
Bloemfontein strike leaders were arrested (318). On the same date 62 people were
arrested in the Labour Party offices in Johannesburg for contravening the re-
gulations stipulating that no more than 6 people can be at a gathering (314).
. Martial Law regulations gave the authorities wide powers and imposed impossible
restrictions on the strikers. The regulations forbad picketting, any attempt to
induce workers to strike, any interference director indirect with employees or
relatives of employees of the railways, power station etc. It was prohibited
to use insulting language threats or "objectionable epithets". It was illegal to
be on railway premises or lines unless one was working there or had obtained a
permit (320).
The Government did not intend to rely on these regulations merely as a deterrant.
They intended to enforce obedience to them. A telegram was sent by the control
/•' officer for Pretoria to the officer in charge at Witbank on the thirteenth :-
"The Minister desires most particular precautionshaken to protect collieries
of Witbank and requires that a guard of 50 men determined to shoot if any
people try to interfere with the working of the collieries or .pull out
the men working there" (321).
»
On the same day he sent a telegram to all officers after receiving a wire from the
Minister of Defence Smuts:-
"Excess greatest possible severity. Keeping all strikers off railway and
running premises. Don't hesitate to shoot if they attempt enter after
warning or on apparently malicious intent. The names of persons attempting
to interfere with running staff to taken and reported here" (322).
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Martial Law regulations were sent to Magistrates for posting up in prominent
places. New notices were issued and modifications of the regulations made as
the authorities saw fit. On the sixteenth a notice posted up offering a reward
of £25 for reporting cases of unlawful possession of explosives. A notice forbid-
ding the sale of alcohol was posted on the twenty third. A permit was required
to sell petrol or any inflammable material. A curfew was imposed and it was
necessary to obtain a permit to be out after dark. The regulation on explosives
was altered so that anyone found in unlawful possession of explosives would be
liable to be brought before a military tribunal and sentenced to death. Any-
body found near any public building, railway premises, power station, telegraph
installation etc must come forward with his hands raised and would be liable to
arrest. If he refused to come forward the Government forces could shoot him.
The regulations were extremely wide ranging and open to various interpretations
according to the predeliction of the controlling officer,Complaints of harsh
enforcement in Bloemfontein led to revealing correspondence between General
Smuts and the controlling officer there. Smuts questioned him about 3 regulations
promulgated in Bloemfontein (323): the first of these stated that no striker could
leave his home without special permission. The controlling officer justified this
.in terms of regulation 15 which allowed him to regulate the movements of any
person. The second forbad the display of red flags. The controlling officer justi-
fied this in terms of Regulation 21 G which prohibited acts liable to prejudice
good order. The third made it an offence to assist any striker, directly or
indirectly, in the form of food, money etc. Smuts replied to these justifications
agreeing to any promulgation the controlling officer made as long as it did not
conflict with those published in the Government Gazette. He instructed the
controlling officer to withdraw the second and third regualtions when he judged
they were no longer necessary. These regulations were enforced where possible.
For example, arrests were made of strikers found in the streets of Bloemfontein
The authorities also endeavoured to break the strike by preventing communication
between workers, by arresting leaders, and by isolating areas where the strike
was strong.. Under the regulations public meetings were prohibited and generally
congregations of strikers attempting to meet together were dispersed (325). Some
meetings were prohibited and the authorities used the opportunity to obtain the
names of leaders from police spies sent to the meetings (326). The controlling
officers were responsible for censoring all communications and newspapers. The
editor of the Transvaal Chronicle was reprimanded for articles in his paper and
warned that he must submit all copy to the control officer. On the eighteenth
the plant of the 'Strike Herald1 was seized. In order to isolate Pretoria,
where the strike war most strongly supported, and prevent communication between
strike leaders the staff officer in Pretoria instructed the editor of the 'Pretoria
News' to insert in his paper of the fourteenth the following notice:- "It is
notified for general information that the Pretoria - Johannesburg roads are closed
to travellers not in possessions of a permit".
Cables, which had been sent from England, for the information of the South African
public on protest meetings in England condemning the S.A. Government's actions,
were suppressed. In a letter of thanks to the Government censor for his diligence
General Smuts wrote:-
"were those messages now published apart from effect they would have on
the strikers and labour sumpathizers their effect on English and
Dutch speaking citizens now supporting the Government might have in-
calculable consequences seeing that they would be regarded by the majority
of people not well informed as representing general view of public in
United Kingdom". (327).
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. The Government, through its regulations, censorship and the armed forces repressed
any murmur of dissension. Any possible focus for organization of strikers or
mobilization of support was made impotent. Public meetings were prohibited,
trade union and labour party leaders arrested, trade union offices ransacked and
all their documents removed. (328). For the same reasons the riqhts of local
authorities were curtailed. For example, the Pretoria Town Council had to specially
request the permission of the controlling officer to call a special meeting for
the twentieth of the Town Council to discuss the industrial crisis. The controlling
officer gave permission providing that nothing was said which might promote
"dissaffection or ill-feeling" and that no discussion must take place in relation
to the Governments action in the strike. No members of the public were allowed
to attend and the only report permittted for press publication was to be an
official communique drawn up by the control officer. (329).
As one would expect with the incompetence of leaders and the weakness of trade
union organisation on the one hand the autocratic methods of the Government on
the other, the strike was a total failure.
9.5 1914 Strike - The Worker's Response
Railway workers had every reason not to respond to a call for a strike no matter
what the circumstances. They were governed by the Railways and Harbours Service
(".-.Act of 1912, which prohibited striking with penalties of up to £50 and/or six
months with or without hard labour. More importantly the strikers forfeited
pension rights, lost all their contributions to the sick fund and lost holiday
rights. For those workers housed by the Administration they risked ejection from
their homes.
Apart from this, on the sixteenth the Chief Mechanical Engineer at Salt River
informed the strike committee that no active participant in the strike would be
allowed to return to work (330). On the same day the Manager warned strikers
not to use "opprobrious epithets" to non-strikers or they would be dismissed
immediately (331). The workers must have been aware that a blacklist was being
drawn up. This was done on the instructions of General Smuts on the thirteenth when
he wired control officers:-
"Government desire police to be very careful to take names and full parti-
culars of individual railway employees who have been in any way ringleaders
or threatened violence or been conspicuous in pulling out other employees" (332)
The railway workers were aware that the compiling of a black list was not an
empty threat. One of their grievances was the discrimination practised against
f people who had been black listed for trade union activities in the past. In
December 1914 the General Secretary of the ASRHS petitioned Prime Minister Botha
asking for the position of 500 men who had been blacklisted and dismissed to be
reconsidered (333). As late as 1926 the railway unions complained about the
continuance of victimisation of men active in the 1914 Strike (334) .
The strict censorship of the press makes it difficult to assess the number of
workers who struck not to mention the feelings of the rest of the workers. The
newspapers generally used figures from the report of the General Manager of the
railways. As a rejoinder to the Administrations claim that the strike was poorly
supported the Transvaal Federation published their own bulletins until their press
was seized (335). Just as the capitalist press distorted in their own interests
so did the trade union press in an attempt to rally support and prevent
demoralisation. The records include a few magistrate's reports which are probably
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reliable (336). The reports of the controlling officers do not give very full
information on the numbers of workers who struck or which sections struck. They
are a useful source for assessing the workers' feelings although they have to-be
treated with a certain circumspection because the officers have an interest in
exaggerating the possible support for the strike and the importance of the effects
of their actions. In his notes on the Railways and Harbours Strike and Service
Amendment Act the law adviser wrote that the strike was well supported in the
railway workshop in Pretoria and Johannesburg and later spread to the workshops of
Natal, OFS and the Cape but that generally the running staff remained at work (337) .
It seems to have been the case, as one might anticipate, that the strike was
most fully supported by railway workshop employees. These were well organised,
most of them belonging to the craft unions. They were skilled and therefore
not easily replaceable and therefore felt more secure in striking.
The strike seems to have been most fully supported in Pretoria and Bloemfontein.
In Pretoria there were nearly 1 000 white workers employed in the railway workshops,
the large majority struck on the eighth. Some running staff also struck work. (338) .
On the eleventh the building workers of Pretoria voted to strike. In retaliation
the National Federation of Building Trade Employers resolved that in future they
would only negotiate with trade unions which consisted solely of building trade
workers (339). On the sixteenth the troops completely cordoned off the railway
- premises in Pretoria to prevent strikers contacting workers (340). On the nine-
teenth the white workers in the municipal workshop (pta) struck in sympathy with railway
workers (341). Despite reports of a return to work in other-centres most
Pretoria strikers did not return until the Minister gave notice on the twenty-second
that all employees must return by the twenty third or they would be considered as
having retired (342).
The strike was at first well supported by the railwaymen in Blce/mfontein. All
the workshop staff, 300 men, struck on the eighth and tried to persuade the
running staff to join. On the eleventh when they read a message from the general
manager that the men in other centres wanted to return to work they treated the
claim with contempt and tore up all the messages (343) . On the twelfth the
strikers gained control of the station and stopped trains going through. The
authorities regained control and operated a reduced service (344). On the fifteenth
a demonstration of strikers who wanted to hold a meeting to enrol rupport was
dispersed when the control officer threatened to use force if they refused (345).
Some workers returned and by the fifteenth there was a full service operating
through Bloemfontein (346). By the seventeenth all the strikers had returned
except 36 whose names were posted up as not wanted. This included all the leaders (347)
v - The response to the strike in other areas varied. Frowthe eighth the strikers
controlled waterval Boven and cut all the telegraph wires. Troops arrived on the
13th and trains began operating from here on the 14th (348).
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On the 10th all the railwaymen at Breyton railway centre, Ermelo and Zeerust
and some of the railwaymen at Pieterburg struck work (349). As far as the Cape
was concerned the greatest support was from the railway workshop employees.
According to the General Managers' report even so only 310 out of 1420 workers
struck (350). By the sixteenth all the workers at the Cape had returned except
for 43 men at the Salt River works whom the management did not went back (351).
There was no strike in Port Elizabeth. The authorities permitted one meeting there on
the 14th at which local members of parliament and members of the Provincial '
Council spoke. They acknowledged the workers' grievances but condemned the
strike (352). Over 400 railway workers and some building workers struck in
Durban. The building workers did not return until the 25th of January - the
last to return (353).
The General Strike call by the Federation was only supported by a few unions.
9059 workers struck on 54 gold mines, 43 957 shifts were lost (354). The gold
mines were fully protected by troops to prevent reoccurances of the 1913 events.
In 1913 55 gold mines had been affected. 19 000( workers were affected and 69 665
shifts were lost (355). The 1914 figures indicate a considerable amount of
support considering the difficulties involved in striking. By the 15th of
January all the gold mines on the Reef were operating. Over 400 workers struck
at Premier Mine, 70.remaining at work. They were all dismissed and replacments
^ . found (356). All the white workers at the Cornelia Mine at Viljoens Drift struck
on the fifteenth. In Johannesburg the Typographical Union also struck in sympathy
which prevented the publication of several newspapers. The 'Transvaal Leader1
immediately declared itself a non-union shop (357). Neither SATU workers nor the
workers at Premier Mine were affiliated to the Federation yet they responded to
the strike call.
Without leadership, unable to communicate and unable to use strike tactics like
picketting and mass meetings to maintain a sense of purpose and solidarity it is
surprising that the strike continued as long as it did. It indicates a large
degree of militancy and sense of grievance. As soon as leaders were arrested
the focus of demands was shifted on to a demand for their release. The strike
committee attempted to rally the workers on this point. In spite of the fact
that the press and the government called the strike leaders "dangerous syndicalists"
no attempt was made in their propoganda to suggest using anything other than
constitutional means. They did not urge the workers to use force or sabotage but,
rather, thry urged passive resistance. A leaflet issued by the Federation on
the fifteenth and signed by the SALP leader F.H.P. Creswell said:- S«»Ji-
"The Government declared Martial Law, imprisoned leaders, they are trying'to
,.;. terrorise you back to work
Do not be terrorised into working •*••*•
Do not be provoked into violence
Keep cool stick together and sit tight (358)
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The ideology of the Federation is clearly expressed in another propoganda
leaflet. It is not exactly syndicalist.
"Whether South Africa is to be a free country, or a country of forced
labour terrorised by Government rifles at the dictation of a slave
driving oligarchy; a country in which industrial or political opponents are
to be crushed by Martial Law ... You, by keeping up the struggle are the
truest patriots. You, by keeping solid, are the real nation builders. Yours
is a war, not against the community but for it. You are battling for
genuine FREE LABOUR, not for scab protection, but for conditions that will
make this country attractive to all the world, a land of the free, a land
that men can love as their home. It is Liberty itself that is at stake" (359).
Even expressed in such militant style these sentiments are clearly compatible
with 'liberal capitalism'
The reports of the controlling officers give an insight into the effect the
Government's measures had on the strikers. According to the Controlling Officer
for the Pietermaritzburg area;
"The proclamation of Martial Law had a wonderful effect on strikers, who
imagined we Would adopt most drastic measures there under ...
Any sign of picketting was at once arrested ... In Durban picketting was
attempted but proved a failure owing to the constant patrolling carried out
by troops, and my distinct orders that any interference with workers would
C-\ not be tolerated" (360).
The report of the control officer for the Cape Western district is worth quoting
in full. At the beginning he details the sending of troops to Salt River works,
the railway station and the docks,-
"In my opinion this sudden display of force had a great moral effect upon
the situation in Cape Town and uncoubtedly prevented a large proportion of
men from striking who would otherwise have done so, whilst it doomed the
strike to certain failure from the outset; furthermore it actually
weakened the ranks of the strikes as about 195 men called up for duty with
the Defence Force were drawn from the Salt River works and included some hot-
headed young mechanics who were in sympathy with the strike. I was criticised
a good deal at the time for making this move, but I am perfectly satisfied...
that this display of force contributed more than anything else to the
complete and speedy victory of the forces of law and order. Railway officials
who previously were anything but loyal suddenly found themselves filled
with a determination to stand by Government
 at all costs but it is
difficult to go forward when a bayonet is firmly pressed against ore's
breast, and it is equally difficult for labour agitators to organise a
(\ succesful strike when the certainty of its failjjre is dominant in the
minds of the would-be strikers. I have not the least doubt that had this
strong measure not been taken a very much larger number of railway and
other trade unionists in Cape Town would have struck work and the strike
would have been of much longer duration, the strong force at my disposal
made it possible for me to guarantee that no intimidation, direct or in-
direct would be allowed and that workmen who desired to pursue their calling
would be given the utmost protection possible. The failure of the strike
in Cape Town had also a very considerable moral effect upon the railway
service elsewhere in the Union" (361).
The other control officers give little information on the course of the strike
and concentrate on details of mobilization, arrest of leaders and the mobilization
of "leading citizens" as special constables.
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SECTION 10
Reasons for the Government's Actions in 1914 Strike
According to their own rationalisation the action taken by the Government was
necessary because the South African state was threatened by a "syndicalist con-
spriacy" (362). The strong measures taken were necessary because of the threat to
established law and order.From this view point the workers were protected from
intimidation by dangerous syndicalists. To ensure the future safety of the
workers on the 26 of January these "syndicalists" were removed from jail and deported
to England (363).
10.1 The Syndicalist Conspiracy
Syndicalism was a doctrine of the left.of the labour movement in Europe and
America - more voluble and talked about than widespread or effective. Like
communism, its aim was to transfer the control of the means of production to
the working class the trade unions were to be the means of mobilization of the
working class and the basis of the social and political structure of the future
,, . socialist state. The synditalists differed from the right and left wings of the
' 'labour movement in their abstention from political involvement. The fight
against the bourgeois state was to be confined to the industrial arena whfe they
advocated go-slows, industrial subotage and strikes to rally their forces and
wear away the enemy, the utimate battle for control being the aeneral strike.
Communist ideology was certainly important amongst the working class of the ad-
vanced capitalist world though it is difficult to determine the role of specifi-
cally syndicalist ideology. Smuts, and most others of his class, did not dis-
criminate between working class ideologies. Any movement against the existing
state or advocating a general strike was called syndicalist.
In his evidence to Parliament on the syndicalist nature of the strike Smuts'
'proof largely consisted of quotes from the speeches of the leaders. The
speeches were collected from police and newspaper reports of trade union meetings
from the beginning of the 1913 strike. In their speeches the leaders were in-
doubtedly militant. For example;-
A.Crawford speaking to the workers at Benoni - 26-5-13 -
"Now Mr Waterston has just told you that the engine drivers are coming out
tonight. Perhaps they will leave their engines well oiled. I said 'perhaps \
If I was an engine driver I would oil the engines with sand. And if I
v understood anything about electrical work I wouTd create difficult short
circuits ... Militant workers must recognise that these things cannot be
done by peaceful methods ... you must act deeds, not words and according to
the new strike philosophy every man must be a law unto himself" 364).
>
G. Mason speaking to the workers 1.7.13
"No scab had a right to live as long as there was a rope long enough to
hang him or a pool of water deep enough to drown him". (365).
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After a general strike had been called, the 'Worker1 the organ of the Labour
Party in an article on the third of July wrotet-
"War has been declared ... We can still be constitutional, that is, avoid
common crime like murder or arson: but now it is war, the shoe has got
to be made to pinch everywhere as tight as it will go, until they cry for
mercy and really, once it is war, the things usually called murder, arson
destruction of property and so on, become the principle occupation of armies,
and there is no reason in principle,but only in tactics, why they should
not be included in the various forms of acute pressure which have to be
exercised in "industrial war" (366).
From the police compilation of speeches Crawford, Mason, Bain, J.F. Brown, Water-
ston, G. Kendall, Carbis, McKerrall, and J. Clarke were all liable to be charged
with at least one of the following: inciting to violence, inciting workers to
strike, attempting to reduce the police from other duty, inciting black workers
to break their contracts (367). After the 1913 strike these leaders held propoganda
meetings at which they often spoke of the need to arm in the face of the threat
from the state, though sometimes some of them, particularly Crawford, concentrated
on the need to organise strong trade unions (368).
During the 1913 strike the Federation assumed some of the functions of government.
('• In Benoni passes were issued to those who supported the strike which was necessary
to ensure immunity from attack. The Federation also attempted determine which
municipal service they would allow to operate. They called on various municipal
employees to strike but 'permitted' some essential service employee to remain at
work. (369).
In August 1913 a deputation from the Federation interviewed the Secretary for
Mines who discussed impending industrial legislation with them (379). They
told him that they were not interested in a trade union act because trade unions
have forced all the recognition they want. They went on to say that the Govern-
ment imposes its will by force and the Federation as the Government of Labour
would also impose its will by using the forces at its disposal if its demands
were not granted. The Federation representatives claimed they could call on
the white workers whenever they wanted.
All this evidence in an indication that militant trade unionists were becoming prominent.
This is what one would expect in a situation where trade unions are not given re-
cognition by government or employers. There is no evidence of plans to take over
control of the state. Some of these trade unionists supported the labour party
( and hoped for realisation of some of their demands by constitutional political
means. Others hoped to realise their demands by putting pressure on the state
and employers by the use of the strike weapon. One must distinguish between
the words and deeds of the trade union leaders. Although towards the end of the
year in their speeches some leaders, notably Livingston and Mason, advised
workers to arm themselves, when the Trades Hall was evacuated no weapons were
found (371). in January 1914 when the Defence Forces were called up the Strike
Committee issued the following notice:-
"The Committee grants permission to all members of the union defence Force
who may be called upon to do so to report themselves as desired by the
authorities. The committee recommend that no member should decline to report
if requested" (372)
366 'The Worker' 3.7.13 Annexures and Evidence of Town Clerk
367 'Justice' 192 3/35/14 ;•
368 ibid
369 Disturbances Commission Amixuren and Evidence of Town Clerk 0 5667
370 'Justice' 178 3/1418/13 Secretary Mines to Minister Mines 27.8.13
371 'Justice' 193 3/84/14 DC 168 1/7164
372 Quoted in 'Militana1 1/3 1969 p. 71
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During the strike the papers of the ASRHS Pretoria and trade union papers at the
Trades Hall Johannesburg were seized. A government official was appointed to
sort through these papers and report on the strike plans of the trade unions. ..
He found nothing of a seditious nature (373). He has also requested to find
evidence for Smuts to use in his speech on the Indemnity Bill of plans by the
leaders to form a provisional Government.The only document remotely connected
with taking on government functions concerned a suggestion at a meeting to
from a Provisional Council for Public Safety in case of danger from blacks (374).
Part of the aim of the government was to isloate the "extremists" from moderate
elements in the labour movement. Accordingly the Minister of Defence objects
when the control officer informed him of the arrest two labour party leaders.
Dreswell and Boydell, for conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice and wanted to
know what offence they had committee because the governments policy is to allow
"considerable latitude to the utterances and attitudes of labour members of
parliament and so long as they use the usual claptrap of the party and do
not advocate syndicalist methods the government does not wish to exercise
its powers of arrest" (375).
However, as the defence of the deported leads by Creswell is Parliament and the
mass protest meetings shows the"moderates"did not set up such an absolute division
between themselves and the so-called syndicalists (376). When Creswell and
; loydell arrived in Cape town, after being released from prison, they were met by
an enthusiastic crowd of about 5 000. In their speeches to the crowd the labour
leaders condemned the government's actions in the strike and the deportations (377).
Although they advocated militant tactics there is no evidence that any of the
'syndicalists' had any part in the dynamiting and sabotage of the railways. The
controlling officers draw up a list of 39 such cases during the strike period,
an index of the fairly easy availability of explosive and the frustration of
the workers to whom more usual strike methods were closed (378).
The strike was ineptly organised, the strike leaders depending on spontaneous
enthusiasm due to the militancy of some sections of workers rather than labourious
perparation and hard work. There is no evidence of any plan to usurp government
authority. This does not mean that Smuts and his like were completely insincere
in there talk of a syndicalist conspiracy. They feared and detested socialists and
saw them as alien,describing them as "foreign agitators". (379). In fact, all
the men deported in 1914 were foreign born - 5 were Scottish, 2 English, one
Australian and one dutch.
( "Jmuts wanted vengence for the humiliating experience ofrHiis agreement with the
"foreign agitators" July 1913. In his own words;
"I admit freely that it was one of the hardest things I have done in my
life to put my name on a document together with that of Mr Bain and the
others" (380).
I believe a genuine fear of syndicalism and a desire to redress humiliation played
a part is determining the action taken by the Government in 1914. I have also
suggested various reasons in the section on the Defence Force. I explore other
factors below including the overriding consideration - the black population.
373 'Justice' 193 3/82/14 Deputy Commissioner SAP to Secretary Justice 11.1.14
374 'Justice' 193 3/18/14
375 'Justice' 191 Smuts to control 16.1.14
376 Creswell op. cit. The debate on the Indemnity Bill was the longest ever in
Parliament up to that date due to the
377 'Diamond Fields Advertiser1 31-1-14
378 DC 168 7/7169
379 e.g. Speech by John X Meriman, Stellenbosch, 'The Strike and its Lessons'
published Cape Times 5.8.13
380 Quoted in 'Die Randse Staking van 1914 J. Ploeger p. 64 'Militaria' 1/3 1969
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1°-2 Black Peril
"The native question is the most serious one for South Africa, and in regard
to the industrial unrest it is the greatest problem that we have to face" (381)
The extent of the mobilisation and the forcefulness of the actions was a precau-
tionary measure in case of black unrest and also intended as an object lesson to
the blacks.
During the 1913 strike white miners and some leaders had attempted to induce
blacks to strike - either through persuasion or intimidation. Pickets at the
New Kleinfontein had tried as early as the eleventh of June to get blacks to
strike for more pay (382). In his evidence the General Superintendent of the
Native Recruiting Corporation H.M. Baberer claimed that blacks who struck on the
fourteenth of June told him they were afraid to go down because of threats by
white workers to blow them up under ground. (383). He claimed that;
"at one time- it was difficult to know whether the natives would not go on
to the side of the strikers" (384) . On the twenty third of June, four days
after the white workers, the black workers on the Van Ryn struck work, on
the third of July 600 blacks at Driefontein and many at the New Comet struck
work. There were disturbances and rioting at Wolhuter, City Deep and
,-. . Crown Mines until the 9th July. On the eighth of July a total of nine
• thousand blacks struck at the City and Suburban,Meyer and Charlton, Village
Main Reef and Village Deep. On the ninth of July the black workers at
Modderfontein B refused to work. In all these cases workers were forced
back to work at the point of b yonet (385) . According to the Native
Grievances Enquiry a serious crisis was^narrowly averted. If the blacks
had come out when police and troops were occupied with white rioters there
was a risk of a serious outbreak possibly spreading all along the Reef (386).
The authorities believed that these strikes were partly to be explained by the
actions of white workers threatening the blacks but they also believed blacks were
imitiating white worker methods in the hope of gaining increased wages and other
concessions themselves.
"During the strike the natives had not only been interested spectators of
the methods employed by the European strikers but some had actually followed
their lead in fomenting dissatisfaction urging natives to strike and
picketting and threating those who did not comply with the demands" (387) .
Apart from the fear of the effect on blacks consciousness of the sight of whites
striking and whites fighting one another there was another concrete fear;
V"' "All of them (black mineworkers) want more pay a"nd most of them are under
the impression that the employment of force by European miners during
the riots of last July resulted in the latter obtaining their demands" (388)
The viability of the gold mining industry,the basis of the economy, depended on
cheap labour as already explained in the introduction. The gold mines could not
continue operation if forced to concede wage increases to the mass of the workers (389)
The government feared that the effect on blacks of seeing inter-white disputes
would be to lessen their respect for white authority. They wanted to control blacks
381 Merriman op. cit.
382 Disturbances Commission Evidence of Assistant Magistrate Boksburg and
Resident Magistrate Boksburg Q849-63 Q 81028
383 ibid. TabererQ.6833-6853
384 ibid Q6853
385 NA 208 210/14 F473
386 Native Grievances Commission UG 37*14 parag. 482
387 NA 208 210/14 F473
388 Native Grievances UG 37'14 parag. 474
389 see Johnstone R. 'Class Race, and Gold'
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by mean of black respect for white superiority, "moral persuasion" rather than
"fixed bayonets". (390). The reason given by the magistrate reporting on the
Premier Mine riots for the violence then shown towards whites was the fact that
 :
their authority had been undermined (According to the inspector reporting on the
Jagfontein Riot of the (391) ninth of January the animosity towards Whites in
authority was due to;
"the far reaching spirit of unsettlement in the relations between labour
and authority which was predominant at that time. . There can be no doubt
that doctrines as to the supremacy of labour and the power of numbers have
invaded the native compounds and for the present it is sufficient I think
to regard the new development as a symptom more of class than of race
antagoraisms — it is certainly not pleasant to conjure the picture of
conflict precipitated by the agitations of labour when aggravated by deep-
rooted antipathies of race and colour" (391A).
Part of the governments policy towards blacks was to maintain the control of
"customary rulers" over them. However, the chiefs were dissatisfied because of
the Land Act which restricted the areas of land to be available for blacks
to purchase. The editorial in Ilanga Lase Natal of the thirteenth of June 1913
said that sending representatives to England to appeal for redress of repressive
laws was useless and that all the chiefs should band together and order all the
people to strike which would be a more effective weapon than attempting a rising
(392).
On the 1st of January 1914, following the strikes of Indian workers 300 black
workers at the Natal Navigation Colliories struck work for increased pay. They
returned to work on the 3rd. On the second 700 blacks at Glenco . Colliories Natal-
struck work demanding increased pay. They returned on the fifth (393).
At this time of general labour unrest and the undermining of the established
control mechanisms the government felt the need to asset its repressive capacity.
In an attempt to forestall unrest amongst the black gold workers during the white's
strike the Prime Minister issued a notice to be read to all the mine workers. He
told them that the strike was between the government and its servants and had
nothing to do with the blacks. If the strike spread to the mines the black workers
will be paid anyway and there we many armed men Johannesburg to deal with
anyone committing acts of violence and any disobedience will be severly dealt
with.. The message and the force available was effective and there were no
strikes by black during the white workers* strike of 1914. According to an
officers report;
"Natives are quiet and appear cowed by the presence of the burghers" (394).
The force available in 1914 was also seen as necessary in case of any breakouts of
blacks from their compounds. During a successful strike by white miners blacks
have no work to do. During the New Kleinfontein strike the manager arranged to
keep blacks occupied reopening roads, cleaning etc. (395). In the long term it
would be difficult to keep the 200 000 blacks on the Rand gold mines active.
390 'Native Grievances' parag. 480
391 NA 208 210/14 F473 Rose-Innes, to Acting Attorney General 27.12.13
392 NA 207 98/14/F473
393 SAMR 1028 305 Lieutenant Colonel SAMR to DSO.
394 SAMR 1084 215/14/3
395 MNW 240 mm 10505/14 New Kleinfontein Co. Ltd. to Chairman, Board of Director
27.1#. 14,
391A NA 208 220/14/F473 inspector OFS Labour District to Director Native Labour
21-3-14
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Horrific possibilities were imangined especially if there was a shortage of food
as well. In regard to the 1913 strike the Governor General wrote:-
"Had authority not been maintained no hold on mine boys could have been re-
tained. Reduced to idleness, massed in compounds and brought to starvation by
railway stoppages, only too probable with electric cables cut, they would have
broken box and the horror of the situation can hardly be exaggerated. Then every
kraal in South Africa would have heard of the white man's impotence". (396)
In a similar vein the organiser of the citizens "defence force" in 1913 J. Fitz-
patrick said;
"Those of us who know anything of the uncivilised native out of control,
know that if the attempt to turn loose 200. 000 savages on a town without
light and water were allowed to succeed this place would have been such
a hell upon earth as no-one has ever seen" (397).
The government were also aware of the disruptive effects a strike has on recruiting.
As already stated, during the 1913 strike the Government prohibited recruiting.
During the 1914 strike they warned companies that they would cancel the blacks con-
tracts and repatriate them at the companies' expense if they did not pay the
workers during the period of the strike (398). In August 1913 the Government
relaxed the prohibition on the recruiting of blacks but the recruiting organisa-
tion complained that recruiting was very slow, few blacks volunteering because they
(•" feared that the white workers would strike again (399).
After the riots on the Jagersfontein the magistrate suggested the formation of a
volunteer corps by white employees in case of reoccurances. The undersecretary
for Defence warned that this was contrary to the provisions of the Defence Act
1912 but it was possible for white employers to form "Defence Rifle Association
and thus obtain rifles,alternatively, they could be sworn in as special constables
under the Police Act and form a regular crops - uniformed, discipline and drilling
(400). Similarly the magistrate for Ladysmith applied to have white employees
at Elandslaagte sworn in as special constables, the same as the white employees
at Ballengleich in case of further Indian strikes (401).
This role for white workers vis a vis the black was much more satisfactory to
the white polity which felt threatened by any dissension within the ranks of the
'superior race*. In Smuts' words;
"This is not a country where we can allow a state of anarchy to prevail.
We are a small colony in a Dark continent. Whatever divisions creep in among
the whites are sure to be reflected in the conduct of the native population,
and if ever there was a country where the white population must ever be
(•-.,. watchful and careful and highly organised and i^ iady to put down with an
iron hand all attempts such as were made on the present occasion, that
country is South Africa. The Government felt that and has acted accordingly"
(402).
396 Correspondence relating to disturbance on the Rand
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